>> I tend to view this as the difference between objective reality and subjective reality (ie: the human experience of "reality"). I'm sure I've stated it elsewhere: I think the two are quite different.
We all seem to agree that a large portion of our experience is pervaded by imputation of conception. We encounter an object that performs a function, and we assign a name to that object based upon the function it performs. Consequently, we make the assumption that the object inherently exists based upon the names and functions we have imputed upon it. We all seem to agree that this is a mistaken awareness that improperly constructs our reality, and that by removing the incorrect basis, we can discover what is actually there.
Buttonion has put it very beautifully; The term software is a convention. It is an abstraction.
When we encounter an object such as a chair, we immediately assign it inherent existence based upon it's function. Our mind spontaneously informs us that the object we have encountered is, independently, a "chair". It's very easy for us to remember that "chair" is a conceptualization that exists in dependence upon the presence of an apprehending conciousness. "Chair" is an example of convention, and can be easily ruled out as not inherently existent.
Having discarded the conceptualization of "chair", we may encounter the object again and decide that it is "wood". Our bothersome minds might continue informing us that infront of us is an inherently existent "chair", but careful attention ensures that we see past this deception and apprehend only "wood". Clearly, it is comprised of an arrangement of wood fibres and has a warm wooden colour. But if we continue our investigation, we discover that wood is comprised of molecules, atoms, energies, and so forth. It exists in dependence upon other phenomena. If we are to remain true the original reasoning that carried us past the conceptualization of "chair", we must also recognize "wood" as another convention, a nominal distinction decided upon by the presence of an apprehending conciousness.
Without much difficulty, we can place "wood" in the same category as "chair", as conventional truths that exist only in dependence upon mind. Having dismissed these two conceptualizations, we can encounter the object again, thinking "I have discarded two assumptions made by my mistaken awareness. Now I must have arrived at what is actually there." It is natural for us to fall back upon a new basis for experiencing an object as though it were "out there". Each passing instant of our experience informs us that we are a segregated block of conciousness, encountering objects which are wholly apart from ourselves. It is not easy to oppose such a deeply ingrained mind. This time, we might conclude that "assembly of fundamental consituents" is the object that is actually out there.
We have arrived at this point using our reasoning: "A chair cannot exist inherently because 'chair' is merely a conceptualization imputed upon an object. In this case, 'chair' has been imputed upon a piece of wood. By the same token, 'wood' does not itself exist inherently because the appearance of 'wood' is dependent upon other phenomena which perform a function, such as molecules, atoms, and so forth. In this case, these fundamental consituents function to give rise to the phenomena which we have categorized as 'wood'. Since it is only the mind which apprehends this phenomena as wood, 'wood' is a mere imputation, and cannot exist independently of mind. Therefore, it is these fundamental constituents which exist inherently. All other apprehensions are mere concepts and must be disregarded."
Though, if we are to adhere to our original reasoning, we must remember that distinctions between atoms, electrons, particles, waves and so forth are determined by convention. In the same way that the apprehension of "chair" is a mere imputation upon a phenomena, "atom" is a mere imputation upon the appearance of another phenomena. Our mind encounters a chair and spontaneously informs us that infront of us is a chair, existing from it's own side. In the same way, with the proper instruments, our mind encounters an atom, and spontaneously informs us again, that based upon it's function, we have encountered an object existing from it's own side. If we have concluded the former to be a mistake, we must then conclude the latter also to be a mistake if we are to maintain the integrity of our own line of reasoning.
Like peeling an onion, we can discard each layer of our experience and discover that underneath all of our conceptualizations is only empty space. To Buddhists, this is called "emptiness". We must remember that distinctions exist in just the same way that objects such as "chair" and "wood" exist. Just as we mistakenly apprehend "chair" as inherently existent, we mistakenly apprehend self and other as an inherently existent distinction. If we check carefully, we'll discover that there can be no boundry between self and other, because such a boundry can exist only in dependence upon a mind that believes this is so. If we profoundly understand this, we can avoid the extreme of concluding through this reasoning that nothing exists at all, while simultaneously opposing the extreme from which we are presently abiding: the experience which informs that things exist apart from us, from their own side. We can come to understand that all things, animate and inanimate, are intimately and inextricably connected with ourselves.
Analyzing our experience, we can quickly discover that it is the grasping at an inherentely existent and independent self which gives rise to the appearance of boundries between objects in the first place. No such inherently existent self exists. If, through training and constant practice, we were to profoundly oppose the mind that apprehends objects as inherently existent, we would eventually internalize the wisdom realizing ultimate nature of reality, and the boundries that exist in our experience would begin to disintegrate. Our experience of the world would change, our encounters with other people would change, and most importantly, we would be incapable of experiencing suffering, or of causing others to experience suffering. After all, suffering is a phenomena that occurs in dependence upon a mind which opposes other phenomena. If that mind is profoundly aware that there are no independently unfolding phenomena, that mind would be incapable of apprehending or perpetrating the phenomena of suffering. There would only be harmony, stillness, tranquility, and bliss (How's that for seductive, eh Mr. Mushrooms!  ).
If anyone is interested in learning more about this subject, feel free to PM me, and I will connect you with resources of further learning.
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