Here is another area where I think philosophy has something meaningful to say.
Consider this:
In the first place, let us note Niels Bohr's principle of complimentarity, which amounts to saying that conceiving the electron as a wave and conceiving it as a particle were not only alternative ways of conceiving it but complimentary ways of doing so.
As Werner Heisenberg pointed out, these are "two complimentary descriptions of the same reality.... These descriptions can only partially true, there must be limitations to the use of the particle concept as well as the wave concept, else one could not avoid contradictions. If one takes into account those limitations which can be expressed by uncertainty relations, the contradictions disappear."
In other words, Bohr's principle affirms the principle of non-contradiction as governing our thought, and it is a correct rule of thought only if non-contradiction is an ontological principle governing reality also.
In the second place, let us observe the extraordinary difference between experimental measurements performed by scientists in the realm of classical or macroscopic physics, the realm of objects larger that the atom. Here the properties of the object being measured by the physicists are properties that inhere in the objects themselves, and would exist in reality as such whether measured by physicists or not. In other words, the physical properties of the object and the object itself are not in any way affected by their scientific measurement.
The difference between quantum theory and classical physics lies in the fact that when we try to measure what is happening inside the atom our experimental measurements are intrusive; they affect the object being studied and confer upon the sub-atomic entities or events the properties attributed to them. Supra-atomic physical entities or events, on the other hand, are affected by our measurements to a negligible degree. The properties assigned to subatomic objects or events are conferred upon them by the experimental measurements that quantum physicists make.
The crucial problem to be solved, which Einstein tried but failed to solve, can be formulated by two alternative questions as follows:
1. Is the physical reality of objects and the events within the interior of the atom in itself indeterminate in character; or
2. Is reality at the level of subatomic objects and events indeterminate in itself?
The question was not answered satisfactorily by the thought experiment called the "Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox." The later thinking and experimental work that led to the confirmation of the Bell theorem favors the second answer. Almost all quantum physicists today accept the answer as correct. They think they know that subatomic reality is indeterminate in character. The regularities observed at the supra-atomic level, they say, arise solely from the statistical predictability of large aggregates of atoms. The indeterminacy attributed to subatomic objects and events by Heisenberg's uncertainty principles is not just their indeterminability by us; it is intrinsic to subatomic reality.
Now we can ask the question, "Are the cosmic principles of uncertainty, both in the subatomic and in the supra-atomic levels, epistemic of ontological?" That is to say, do they indicate:
1. Values that are indeterminate by us; or
2. Values that are in themselves indeterminate?
The two questions to which the quantum physicists think they know the right answers are philosophical, not scientific, questions. Questions that, if they can be answered at all, can only be answered by thought, not by research. Unfortunately for its effect on our thought, the quantum physicists presume to answer the questions as if the questions were answerable only by them in the light of their research findings. That is a serious mistake on their part. It is an egregious example of the presumption that scientists in many fields have made again and again in the current times.
Atoms really existed in all the centuries before the scientific work that established their real existence. Atoms had interiors in which physical entities existed and physical events occurred in all the centuries before these facts were 'scientifically established'. It is certainly fair to ask what the subatomic reality was during all those centuries. Was it like the subatomic reality described by the current quantum theory? Was it a physical reality having all the intrinsic character of indeterminacy, or was it an intrinsically determinate physical reality like the supra-atomic reality of classical physics?
To answer that question philosophically, it is logically necessary to bear in mind one point that the quantum physicists appear to forget or overlook. At the same time that the Heisenberg uncertainty principles were established, quantum physicists acknowledged that the intrusive experimental measurements that provided the data used in the mathematical formulations of quantum theory conferred on subatomic objects and events their indeterminate character.
The foregoing italicized words imply that the indeterminate character of subatomic objects and events is not intrinsic to them, not properties they have quite apart from their being affected in any way by the measurements made by intrusive experimental devices.
If the cause of the indeterminate values attributed to subatomic objects and events in quantum theory is the intrusive and disturbing measurement of those objects and events, then does not the elimination of that cause also eliminate its effect?
In other words, was not the physical reality of subatomic objects determinate in all those earlier centuries when the atom existed and had an interior that the experimental measurements of quantum mechanics did not intrude upon and disturb? Can quantum mechanics through its experimentally performed measurements be a disturbing and intrusive influence that affects the character of subatomic reality and, at the same time, can its exponents be certain that subatomic reality has the intrinsic indeterminacy that quantum theory attributes to it? Is the unexamined interior of the atom intrinsically indeterminate or is it like the determinate character of supra-atomic reality?
God knows the answer, as Einstein at the beginning of his controversy with Bohr declared when he said that God does not throw dice, which implied that the unexamined subatomic reality is a determinate reality. Whether or not God knows the answer, experimental science does not know it. Nor does philosophy know it with certitude. But philosophy can give a good reason for thinking that the subatomic reality is intrinsically determinate. The reason is that quantum theorists repeatedly acknowledge that their intrusive and disturbing measurements are the cause of the indeterminacy they attribute to subatomic objects and events. It follows, therefore, that that indeterminacy cannot be intrinsic to subatomic reality.
Unfortunately quantum theory has inadvertently given undue comfort to the worst tendency in contemporary thought, philosophical idealism or constructivism, which denies a reality that exists in complete independence of the human mind and that has whatever intrinsic character it has without being affected by how the human mind knows it or thinks about it.
To sum up:
Quantum theory is a theory of the examined interior of the atom. The scientific examination of that interior is, according to quantum theory, an intrusive disturbance of what is going on there. It follows that further development of quantum and additional scientific investigation cannot tell us about the character of the unexamined atomic interior.
Einstein was right that quantum theory is an incomplete account of subatomic reality. But he was wrong in thinking that that incompleteness could be remedied by means at the disposal of science. Why? Because the question that quantum theory and subatomic research cannot answer is a question for philosophy, not for science.
Cheers,
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