Veritas said: I've spent most of my life taking care of children, starting with my little brother, and the early development of concepts is quite evidently based upon repeated sense perceptions. Have you ever spent time around a toddler who incessantly points and asks "what that?"? They are gathering data with which they will create shorthand concepts to aid them in quickly assessing their environment.
It is possible, I would say even likely, that the concepts are not being learned at that point, the word signifying the concept is being learned. The reason I say this is because universals as sense perceptions, particularly visual, are identified by other animals without using words. Birds and other animals can tell the difference between a triangle and a circle. This is called perceptual abstraction.
Quote: The concept "dog" is built with hundreds of "what that?" sense impression associations. All the times Mom or Dad says "that's a dog, sweetie" are associated with particular qualities of the animal they are currently seeing. They will try out their fledgling concepts when something fits the rules they have learned thus far, pointing to a grizzly bear on TV and saying "dog!" When Mom or Dad says "no, that's a bear," they file away the commonalities and differences for later reference. Eventually they have developed a long list of rules for which animals can accurately be called "dog," and will rarely make a mistake.
As I said, it is not the concept being learned, it is the word signifying the concept.
Quote: These rules are stored in the memory center of the brain, and can be lost as an effect of brain damage.
These "rules" as you call them are a function of the mind, which is in place before the word signifying the concept (actually percept) is learned.
Quote: The same applies to intangible concepts such as "justice," "love," "equality," "freedom," etc...we learn the rules of the definition, see certain situations which someone describes as exemplifying the intangible concept (i.e. "oh, look at the baby hugging his Mommy--he really loves her!"), and can refer to our memory of this in order to apply the intangible concept to future situations.
Not to complicate things even further, but these are examples of concepts versus the precepts we were talking about earlier. Propositional speech, only found in humans, helps us to attach the words to conceptual abstraction, giving them signification.
Quote: You seem to be referring to the Platonic idea of universal concepts, which he claimed were based upon an alternate world of pure forms which we could dimly perceive through the veil between. Plato's thesis was conceived pre-neurological research, and seems to be more fancy than fact.
The concept of universals had its beginning with Plato. However, down through the years it has had significant refinement. Porphyry, Boethius, Aristotle, Bonaventure, down to William of Champeaux, Bernard of Chartres, Clarembald of Arras and Abelard have all had their say.
John Locke's conflation with ideas and concepts being that which we directly apprehend in our mind and that by which we apprehend something else also predates neurological research. It is that, and no other, point at which we disagree. Sadly, neurological research has done nothing to explain it. The debate between two factions continues unabated to this day. It is my contention that neurological research is unable to explain it because it is out of empirical science's grasp. Only with philosophy and science working together may the answer be found.
And while I may not agree with his stance on evolution, I would point to an article by David Berlinski that won The Best American Science Writing in 2005 that clearly shows the thorny problem this is: Link.
Quote: You still have not answered my question as to how you would differentiate between the activity of the brain and this immaterial process you call "mind."
What support can you offer for your claim that conditions besides brain activity constitute sufficient conditions for consciousness?
Well, Ockham's razor for one. The rule of parsimony states we do not add more reasons for a thing if a simpler, or lesser, answer will do. The existence of an immaterial "mind" is the only answer that will suffice in the question of how we recognize sensate perceptions--we being animals. Conceptual abstraction, for the very same reason, is the property of humans alone.
There are at least four distinct positions regarding this problem.
1. Psycho-physical dualists. That the mind, or soul, and the body are two separate entities. Plato and Descartes are the primary authors. It is an extreme position that doesn't need the use of neurological research in order to dispense with it.
2. Materialistic monism. That the brain and the mind are completely synonymous. Thomas Hobbes would appear to be an early author. This position is also extreme and can be easily dispensed with if we agree the brain and the mind are at least analytically distinct.
3. Moderate materialism. I think this is your view.
4. Moderate immaterialiam. This would be my position.
My argument hinges on two propositions. The first asserts that the concepts whereby we understand what different things are like consist of meanings that are universal. The second proposition is that nothing that exists physically is ever universal. The conclusion then is that our concepts which have universality cannot be embodied in matter. If the concepts were acts of the brain, they would be embodied in matter so they couldn't have the requisite universality to function as concepts that enable us to think of individual things.
Therefore, the power of conceptual thought that we use to form concepts (and use them) has to be immaterial.
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