Auto-SummaryThis forum post summarizes a 2004 Defense Science Board Task Force report on strategic communication, highlighting widespread anti-American sentiment and its impact on U.S. national security. The report emphasizes that negative attitudes towards the U.S. are rooted in perceptions of arrogance, hypocrisy, and self-indulgence, rather than solely due to inadequate public diplomacy. The events of September 11, 2001 catalyzed a new national security narrative centered around the "Global War on Terrorism," which, while effective for political leaders and journalists, marginalizes other significant issues and risks focusing on tactics over strategy. The post also discusses the broader Islamist movement, arguing that the U.S. is perceived as an enemy by the majority of Muslims due to perceived hypocrisy and support for authoritarian regimes. Ultimately, the author concludes that American public diplomacy lacks credibility, as the U.S. appears to be the aggressor in a struggle that is both global and country-specific, making it difficult for the U.S. to effectively communicate with the Muslim world and counter radical Islamist narratives.
Even a DOD report backs me up...
Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication
September 2004
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Washington, D.C. 20301-3140
(Here's a link to the .pdf file)
Quote: 1.2 The New Strategic Communication Environment Anti-American attitudes. Opinion surveys conducted by Zogby International, the Pew Research Center, Gallup (CNN/USA Today), and the Department of State (INR) reveal widespread animosity toward the United States and its policies. A year and a half after going to war in Iraq, Arab/Muslim anger has intensified. Data from Zogby International in July 2004, for example, show that the U.S. is viewed unfavorably by overwhelming majorities in Egypt (98 percent), Saudi Arabia (94 percent), Morocco (88 percent), and Jordan (78 percent). The war has increased mistrust of America in Europe, weakened support for the war on terrorism, and undermined U.S. credibility worldwide. Media commentary is consistent with polling data. In a State Department (INR) survey of editorials and op-eds in 72 countries, 82.5 % of commentaries were negative, 17.5% positive.
Negative attitudes and the conditions that create them are the underlying sources of threats to America?s national security and reduced ability to leverage diplomatic opportunities. Terrorism, thin coalitions, harmful effects on business, restrictions on travel, declines in cross border tourism and education flows, and damaging consequences for other elements of U.S. soft power are tactical manifestations of a pervasive atmosphere of hostility.
Although many observers correlate anti-Americanism with deficiencies in U.S. public diplomacy (its content, tone, and competence), the effectiveness of the means used to influence public opinion is only one metric. Policies, conflicts of interest, cultural differences, memories, time, dependence on mediated information, and other factors shape perceptions and limit the effectiveness of strategic communication.
Quote: There is consensus in these reports that U.S. public diplomacy is in crisis. Missing are strong leadership, strategic direction, adequate coordination, sufficient resources, and a culture of measurement and evaluation. America?s image problem, many suggest, is linked to perceptions of the United States as arrogant, hypocritical, and self-indulgent.
Quote: Terrorism as a national security frame. The events of September 11, 2001 were a catalyst in creating a new way to think about national security. The Global War on Terrorism replaced the Cold War as a national security meta narrative. Governments, media, and publics use the terrorism frame for cognitive, evaluative, and communication purposes. For political leaders, it is a way to link disparate events; identify priorities, friends, enemies, victims, and blame; and shape simple coherent messages. For journalists and news consumers the terrorism frame conflates and appears to make sense of diverse national security stories ? Al Qaeda, Jihadists, Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel, Iran, Chechnya, Indonesia, Kashmir, the Philippines, Kenya, Spain.
Frames simplify and help to communicate complex events. But like the Cold War frame, the terrorism frame marginalizes other significant issues and problems: failing states, non-proliferation, HIV/AIDS pandemic, economic globalization, transnational threats other than terrorism, and global warming. Often the terrorism frame directs attention to tactics not strategy. The focus is more on capturing and killing terrorists than attitudinal, political, and economic forces that are the underlying source of threats and opportunities in national security.
Quote: ... this is no Cold War. We call it a war on terrorism; but Muslims in contrast see a history-shaking movement of Islamic restoration. This is not simply a religious revival, however, but also a renewal of the Muslim World itself. And it has taken form through many variant movements, both moderate and militant, with many millions of adherents; of which radical fighters are only a small part. Moreover, these movements for restoration also represent, in their variant visions, the reality of multiple identities within Islam.
If there is one overarching goal they share, it is the overthrow of what Islamists call the ?apostate? regimes: the tyrannies of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Jordan, and the Gulf states. They are the main target of the broader Islamist movement, as well as the actual fighter groups. The United States finds itself in the strategically awkward ? and potentially dangerous ? situation of being the longstanding prop and alliance partner of these authoritarian regimes. Without the U.S. these regimes could not survive. Thus the U.S. has strongly taken sides in a desperate struggle that is both broadly cast for all Muslims and country-specific.
This is the larger strategic context, and it is acutely uncomfortable: U.S. policies and actions are increasingly seen by the overwhelming majority of Muslims as a threat to the survival of Islam itself. Three recent polls of Muslims show an overwhelming conviction that the U.S. seeks to ?dominate? and ?weaken? the Muslim World. Not only is every American initiative and commitment in the Muslim World enmeshed in the larger dynamic of intra-Islamic hostilities ? but Americans have inserted themselves into this intra-Islamic struggle in ways that have made us an enemy to most Muslims.
Quote: 2.3 What is the Problem? Who Are We Dealing With? The information campaign ? or as some still would have it, ?the war of ideas,? or the struggle for ?hearts and minds? ? is important to every war effort. In this war it is an essential objective, because the larger goals of U.S. strategy depend on separating the vast majority of non-violent Muslims from the radical-militant Islamist-Jihadists. But American efforts have not only failed in this respect: they may also have achieved the opposite of what they intended.
American direct intervention in the Muslim World has paradoxically elevated the stature of and support for radical Islamists, while diminishing support for the United States to single-digits in some Arab societies. - Muslims do not ?hate our freedom,? but rather, they hate our policies. The overwhelming majority voice their objections to what they see as one-sided support in favor of Israel and against Palestinian rights, and the longstanding, even increasing support for what Muslims collectively see as tyrannies, most notably Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, Jordan, Pakistan, and the Gulf states.
- Thus when American public diplomacy talks about bringing democracy to Islamic societies, this is seen as no more than self-serving hypocrisy. Moreover, saying that ?freedom is the future of the Middle East? is seen as patronizing, suggesting that Arabs are like the enslaved peoples of the old Communist World ? but Muslims do not feel this way: they feel oppressed, but not enslaved.
- Furthermore, in the eyes of Muslims, American occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq has not led to democracy there, but only more chaos and suffering. U.S. actions appear in contrast to be motivated by ulterior motives, and deliberately controlled in order to best serve American national interests at the expense of truly Muslim self determination.
- Therefore, the dramatic narrative since 9/11 has essentially borne out the entire radical Islamist bill of particulars. American actions and the flow of events have elevated the authority of the Jihadi insurgents and tended to ratify their legitimacy among Muslims. Fighting groups portray themselves as the true defenders of an Ummah (the entire Muslim community) invaded and under attack ? to broad public support.
- What was a marginal network is now an Ummah-wide movement of fighting groups. Not only has there been a proliferation of ?terrorist? groups: the unifying context of a shared cause creates a sense of affiliation across the many cultural and sectarian boundaries that divide Islam.
- Finally, Muslims see Americans as strangely narcissistic ? namely, that the war is all about us. As the Muslims see it, everything about the war is ? for Americans ? really no more than an extension of American domestic politics and its great game. This perception is of course necessarily heightened by election-year atmospherics, but nonetheless sustains their impression that when Americans talk to Muslims they are really just talking to themselves.
Thus the critical problem in American public diplomacy directed toward the Muslim World is not one of ?dissemination of information,? or even one of crafting and delivering the ?right? message. Rather, it is a fundamental problem of credibility. Simply, there is none ? the United States today is without a working channel of communication to the world of Muslims and of Islam. Inevitably therefore, whatever Americans do and say only serves the party that has both the message and the ?loud and clear? channel: the enemy.
-------------------- Money doesn't grow on trees, but deficits do grow under Bushes.
You can accept, reject, or examine and test any new idea that comes to you. The wise man chooses the third way.
- Tom Willhite
Disclaimer: I reserve the right to change my opinions should I become aware of additional facts, the falsification of information or different perspectives. Articles written by others which I post may not necessarily reflect my opinions in part or in whole, my opinions may be in direct opposition, the topic may be one on which I have yet to formulate an opinion or have doubts about, an article may be posted solely with the intent to stimulate discussion or contemplation.
Edited by Prosgeopax (07/08/05 03:09 AM)
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