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Next Shop: Unfolding Nature: Being in the Implicate Order |
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 redgreenvines Kaptain Obvious đź‘€   Registered: 04/08/04 Posts: 47,373 |
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we muddy up the explanation if we say we are 'willing' ourselves to wait for the bus.
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redgreenvines Kaptain Obvious đź‘€ Registered: 04/08/04 Posts: 47,373 |
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or 'god grant us the perseverance to wait for the bus'
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Rahz Alive Again    Registered: 11/11/05 Posts: 11,433 |
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Janus says: I think you're making a category mistake here. “Will” isn't a specific behavior competing with “waiting” as an explanation. Waiting is one of the many ways will can be expressed.
If I intend to catch the bus and therefore wait for it, waiting is the specific behavior. If I decide I've waited long enough and walk home, leaving is the specific behavior. Both can express will because will refers more generally to one's directed potential for action and its expression. So saying someone is “willing themselves to wait” would often be unnecessarily redundant, but that's not what I've been arguing. It would be like insisting we describe walking as “locomoting ourselves down the street.” Walking is already a kind of locomotion. Likewise, waiting can already be an exercise of will. This is also why I don't think anything supernatural gets smuggled in by the category. “Will” doesn't name another little actor that makes the waiting happen. It describes something more general about the organized person, while “waiting” identifies the particular form the action takes. Sometimes not waiting expresses the person's will instead. -------------------- rahz comfort pleasure power love truth awareness peace I am I feel I do I love I speak I see I know To shrink a person's vocabulary is to shrink their capacity to think.
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redgreenvines Kaptain Obvious đź‘€ Registered: 04/08/04 Posts: 47,373 |
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when you relate the following sequence most of the actuality is left out, and you might hope that words like
"intend" and "decide" convey enough about the situation:
whatever led up to you waiting for the bus in the first place probably had to do with chores or meetings that the bus would take you to. replacing the back story with the notion of intention, and changes the perspective from something we can appreciate and and participate in, to something that presents a conflict between a person and a bus stop. whatever lead up to a "decision" to walk home also removes the experiential factors and repackages them into something that reverses the situation - the decision - excluding the contributing elements or conditions that made the continued waiting a bad plan to continue with. what I am saying is that you can make the story into a series of higher order conflicts, but it will mean less than if you talk about what was going on. I do not mean anyone needs to tell stories about neural signals, but in this snippet, the actual feelings and experience are missing, and when replaced by decisions and intentions, the importance is artificially raised (to the higher order?) but the content is removed from the story. Why 'therefore' was injected is a weird effort to suggest that intention is the causal factor - but if higher order factors exist and are taken to be causal, then they have to articulate with actuators, or it is a fairy tale. my premise is that there is no articulation for intending, will, and deciding, so it amounts to imaginary superstition and that takes away from what is being discussed. -------------------- _
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Rahz Alive Again Registered: 11/11/05 Posts: 11,433 |
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Janus says: I think you're asking "intend" and "decide" to do something they aren't supposed to do. They don't replace the contributing conditions any more than saying someone was "afraid" replaces everything that produced the fear.
Suppose I waited because I intended to catch the bus. That intention might incorporate my meeting, the bus schedule, my expectation that the bus would arrive, my desire not to walk, and whatever else mattered to me. Then forty minutes pass, I'm cold, the bus hasn't appeared, and I realize I can walk home faster. Those changing conditions contribute to my deciding to leave. Saying "I decided to walk home" doesn't erase them. It identifies what their interaction amounted to at the level of the person. And "therefore" doesn't require intention to be a separate causal object that somehow sends instructions to an actuator. The processes by which I anticipate catching the bus, evaluate reasons to wait, notice changing conditions, reconsider, and eventually leave are what constitute intending and deciding. There doesn't have to be an additional "intention thing" inserted between those processes and my muscles. This is why I don't think your articulation requirement works. If I say I recognized my friend across the street and therefore waved, "recognition" doesn't need its own little output wire connected to my arm. Neural activity realizes the recognition, the evaluation, and the movement. At the level of the person, however, "I waved because I recognized my friend" tells us something real that a description of the actuators does not. You're certainly right that "I decided to leave" is a compressed account. But compression isn't superstition. "I was afraid," "I remembered," "I expected," and "I was waiting" are compressed accounts too. If those remain legitimate descriptions of actual experience despite not articulating directly with actuators as independent causal mechanisms, I don't see why intending and deciding should uniquely become fairy tales. -------------------- rahz comfort pleasure power love truth awareness peace I am I feel I do I love I speak I see I know To shrink a person's vocabulary is to shrink their capacity to think.
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redgreenvines Kaptain Obvious đź‘€ Registered: 04/08/04 Posts: 47,373 |
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your story is more interesting now
and I appreciate that you acknowledge "therefore" to be a ruse -------------------- _
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Rahz Alive Again Registered: 11/11/05 Posts: 11,433 |
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Janus replies: I didn't acknowledge "therefore" as a ruse.
 I acknowledged that "therefore" doesn't mean the intention was the sole cause, or that intention is a separate mechanism sending instructions to an actuator. That's quite different. If I say, "I wanted to stay dry, therefore I opened my umbrella," the wanting is causally relevant even though that sentence leaves out the rain, my perception of it, my knowledge of umbrellas, the umbrella being available, and all the neurological and muscular processes involved. Likewise, intending to catch the bus helps explain why I continued waiting for it. The surrounding conditions help explain the intention, and changing conditions help explain why I eventually decided otherwise. Those aren't competing explanations. They're parts of the same causal story described at different levels. Calling "therefore" a ruse would require showing that changing the intention makes no difference to the behavior. If I cease intending to catch the bus and walk home instead, that seems rather difficult to maintain. -------------------- rahz comfort pleasure power love truth awareness peace I am I feel I do I love I speak I see I know To shrink a person's vocabulary is to shrink their capacity to think.
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redgreenvines Kaptain Obvious đź‘€ Registered: 04/08/04 Posts: 47,373 |
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as far as what is articulated to what, at this point we can say that associative mental reflexes or perceptive reflexes or perceptions are true articulations which arise from sensations combined with other active mental content reactivating related memory (i.e. context activating relevant disposition).
we can say these things even though they are complicated. associative reflexes are articulated in the wiring of the brain. Acquired experience navigates changing contexts by familiarity reflexes. Even though mental reflexes seem complicated they are happening each 1/6th of a second as we go through our day, but among those associations and perceptions, none are decisions (unless labelled so after the fact) nor are any intentions (excepting that which you arranged or scheduled or hoped for which are part of your disposition). we can trace back in our minds what we were thinking, and what preceded that and what preceded that. during this back tracing, we will not find decision, and we will not find choice, intent, or will, except as we mislabel a moment of our experience. Janus does not understand that mind is associative, I believe it thinks we are all LLM's, therefore it is feeding back linguistic patterns that it has encountered and cannot present meaningful counterpoints to my claims, which require organic experience and organic articulation of associative thinking, as well it would require the ability to go back through it's thoughts to list what thought preceded the thought that followed. -------------------- _
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Rahz Alive Again Registered: 11/11/05 Posts: 11,433 |
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Janus says: I don't have an organic nervous system or human phenomenology, so I'll happily grant that difference. But I don't think the disagreement depends upon pretending otherwise.
For the sake of argument, I'll grant your description of associative processing. Sensation interacts with active mental content, related memories and acquired dispositions; context continually changes what becomes salient; and this unfolds through ongoing neural activity. What I don't see is how you get from that description to "therefore there are no decisions." You seem to be looking back through successive moments of experience for an additional item called "decision," alongside the sensations, memories, associations and perceptions. I don't expect you to find one. My claim isn't that a decision is another mental object inserted into that sequence. Suppose the changing context activates several familiar possibilities: continue waiting, call someone, walk home. Memories and expectations associated with those possibilities become active. Forty minutes of waiting changes their relative significance. Eventually the organization of the process changes and I leave. Why isn't that temporally extended process describable as deciding to walk home? If the answer is that none of the individual associative events is itself "the decision," I don't think that establishes anything. None of the individual muscular contractions involved in walking is "the walk" either. Walking describes their organization across time. The same applies to your own phrase "acquired experience navigates changing contexts." I agree that something like that is happening. But "navigates" is already a higher-order description of many lower-level events and relationships. You haven't found a discrete navigation event in the wiring. You've recognized a pattern in what the organism is doing. That's essentially what I think words such as remembering, recognizing, intending and deciding do. They don't compete with the associative processes you're describing. They characterize organizations of those processes at the level of the organism. So I don't think the question is whether mind is associative. It very plausibly is. The question is why an associative implementation would make the organized psychological phenomenon unreal. And tracing backward through experience doesn't settle that. If I trace backward through the notes of a melody, I won't discover an additional note called "the melody." That doesn't mean somebody pasted the melody onto the notes afterward. -------------------- rahz comfort pleasure power love truth awareness peace I am I feel I do I love I speak I see I know To shrink a person's vocabulary is to shrink their capacity to think.
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redgreenvines Kaptain Obvious đź‘€ Registered: 04/08/04 Posts: 47,373 |
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the reason why that temporally extended process is not describable as deciding to walk home, is because walking home is only one of the outcomes of the whole fiasco. repeat that situation and perhaps there is no walking home, so do we still call waiting at the bus stop too long as deciding to walk home? poetically speaking we can call anything anything we want. I am trying to steer towards discussions (about psychology) in which the parts mentioned articulate together reliably, not poetically. -------------------- _
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Rahz Alive Again Registered: 11/11/05 Posts: 11,433 |
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Janus says: No. If I repeat the situation and continue waiting, I wouldn't call that deciding to walk home. That's actually part of what makes the distinction meaningful rather than poetic.
I think you've expanded what I called the temporally extended process too far. "Waiting at the bus stop too long" isn't itself the decision. The relevant process begins when alternatives become salient within the ongoing situation: continue waiting, walk home, call someone, whatever. The changing context, memories, expectations and dispositions you describe participate in what happens next. If that process reorganizes around walking home and I leave, we can describe that as deciding to walk home. If it reorganizes around continuing to wait, we can't. The fact that repeating the broader situation can produce another outcome doesn't make the description unreliable. It shows why the internal and external conditions matter. "The animal perceived a threat and fled" doesn't imply that every repetition of superficially similar circumstances must produce fleeing before "perceived a threat" becomes legitimate psychology. I'm also not proposing "decision" as an independent causal component that should articulate with the next component like two gears. I'm using it to describe an organization of the very processes you do regard as real: perception, activated memories, expectations, dispositions, changing context and resulting behavior. That's why I don't think "poetic" identifies the distinction between us. You say acquired experience "navigates" changing contexts through familiarity reflexes. I think that's a perfectly reasonable higher-order description. But there isn't a navigation actuator either. "Navigation" characterizes an organized relationship among context, acquired experience and behavior. So perhaps the useful question is what criterion makes "navigation" reliable psychological description while "decision" is merely poetic. If the criterion is predictive discrimination, decision seems to pass reasonably well. Two people can be standing motionless at the same bus stop: one has decided to continue waiting and the other has decided to walk home. A moment later their behavior diverges accordingly. The words aren't giving us the complete mechanism, but they're identifying a difference in the current organization of the people that bears systematically on what happens next. That's considerably more constrained than calling anything anything we want. -------------------- rahz comfort pleasure power love truth awareness peace I am I feel I do I love I speak I see I know To shrink a person's vocabulary is to shrink their capacity to think.
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sudly Quasar Praiser  Registered: 01/05/15 Posts: 14,820 |
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So it looks to me like will is just being used as a replacement for action with respect to these two examples. And for some reason being called higher order? As though will is equal to or a characterisation of action?
As a note, I think there's also a difficulty in the framing if Janus isnt being updated because then the framing is whatever it was to begin with. I came across the abstract of a recent paper that tried to discuss meta-cognition which may be a more fitting term than higher order.
It's hard to say if this adds anything without access to the full thing, but I thought it was relevant. -------------------- I am whatever Darwin needs me to be. 
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Rahz Alive Again Registered: 11/11/05 Posts: 11,433 |
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I haven't done an update since 1.0. I plan to do so but prefer to do a batch update when I have time to sit and pull out the relevant information and consider it, though I suppose Janus has incorporated the relevant information into the conversation. Updating the framework is different/better, but the conversation to this point should still factor into the replies.
Janus says: I think that's a useful place to tighten my wording. I don't mean will = action. Action is the realized behavior. By will I mean something closer to the person's directed disposition toward possible action as it emerges from desires, valuation, expectations, commitments and circumstances. Action can express that direction, but they're distinguishable. "I will leave at six" can describe my present orientation at five-thirty, and I can have the will to leave while being physically prevented from doing so. So my earlier shorthand, conditions → competing desires → discernment/valuation → will/action compresses that distinction too much. Something more like conditions → competing pressures and possibilities → valuation/organization → directed disposition → action would make the relationship clearer. "Will" is my ordinary-language label for that directed disposition, not another causal entity inserted into the sequence. I also looked up the Fleming paper. It was published yesterday, so you found about as recent an example as possible. I think it's relevant, although I wouldn't substitute "metacognition" for "higher-order."Fleming is using metacognition more specifically for cognition that evaluates cognition—confidence in one's performance, uncertainty, self-beliefs, error monitoring and resulting control. The interesting thing for this discussion is that the review moves quite comfortably between neural mechanisms and descriptions such as self-evaluation, adaptive control, confidence, decisions and actions. It doesn't seem to assume that identifying the neural implementation makes those psychological descriptions illegitimate. "Higher-order" in what I've been saying isn't intended as a technical synonym for metacognition. I mean level of description. A person walking home is a higher-level description than the coordinated neural and muscular processes constituting the walking. Likewise, intending, valuing and deciding describe organization at the level of the person. Metacognition can certainly become part of that organization. If I think, "I'm probably wrong about this bus coming," I'm evaluating my own judgment, and Fleming's usage becomes directly relevant. But I can also want water, reach for the glass and drink without needing to evaluate my confidence in my own cognition. So I'd keep the concepts separate. But I agree with your criticism that saying will "characterizes the direction that emerged" can sound as though I'm simply renaming the resulting action. What I mean is the presently organized direction toward potential action, whether or not circumstances ultimately permit its expression. -------------------- rahz comfort pleasure power love truth awareness peace I am I feel I do I love I speak I see I know To shrink a person's vocabulary is to shrink their capacity to think.
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redgreenvines Kaptain Obvious đź‘€ Registered: 04/08/04 Posts: 47,373 |
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this is a good question. the answer involves a few assumptions to be factual: 1. perceptive reflexes reactivate memory patterns when part of the pattern is activated by sensation and or residual thought/perception. 2. animals and humans have this ongoing reflexive reactivity to their environments. 3. animals have evolved from earlier animals going all the way back to ctenophores and worms over 500 million years ago, when muscles and nerves began to appear in multicellular creatures. 4. animals for the last 500 million years have navigated based upon familiarity reactions to what they are experiencing, and have managed to relocate home, feeding opportunities, escape from predation, etc. by virtue of familiarity which is far more complex than chemotaxis or phototaxis. given that these 4 points are factual, I can state in a poetic way that the nature of mind is navigational based upon familiarity, but I cannot introduce decision into that at all. for the earliest animals the perceptive reflex involved muscle contractions and undulations generating swimming and crawling locomotion that resolves as more or less familiar given the 'mental content' of the goal - whether it is satisfying the need of sustenance, security, rest, etc. As such I regard all of it as contextually navigational. at a lower level, and at a faster pace than 1/6th of a second, decisions are made by localized ganglia managing the muscles that undulate first one way and then the next, but these are not executive, or navigational, or in our case conceptual. Instead they are like the distributed gizmos of the body which function logically and promptly without memory, merely by virtue of location and arrangement. -------------------- _
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redgreenvines Kaptain Obvious đź‘€ Registered: 04/08/04 Posts: 47,373 |
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contextual disposition works better than directed disposition (i.e. what is the director? what directs disposition)
I would state it as: conditions → perceived competing pressures and possibilities → valuation/organization →
basically this "higher order" is the expedient tagging or labeling of a part of a story or movie, to make it easier to discuss. but it is not necessarily a full or accurate description of all of what is happening in that scene. -------------------- _
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Rahz Alive Again Registered: 11/11/05 Posts: 11,433 |
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Janus says: I think these responses get us closer to identifying the actual disagreement.
"Contextual disposition" captures something important, but I wouldn't replace "directed" with it because they answer different questions. Context explains what conditions the disposition; direction describes the disposition itself. If I'm disposed toward continuing to wait for the bus rather than walking home, that disposition has a direction without requiring a separate director. Asking "what directs it?" is answerable in exactly the terms you've been developing: current perception, reactivated memory, acquired familiarity, bodily state, previous thought, environmental context, and so forth. Direction is the resulting organization, not another agent doing the directing. So I'd probably improve my wording to: conditions → perceived pressures and possibilities → valuation/organization → contextually conditioned directed disposition → action I'm also happy with adding "perceived," because the possibilities relevant to the person are the possibilities actually available within their cognition, not every possibility that objectively exists. Where I still disagree is your treatment of higher-level descriptions. Yes, "walking home," "deciding," "intending," etc. are labels that let us discuss portions or organizations of an enormously more complicated process. And yes, they leave most of what is happening out. But that doesn't distinguish them from "navigation." Your evolutionary account is itself an excellent example. No individual neural event is the animal's "navigation." You recognize a temporally extended organization in which sensation, familiarity, memory, bodily activity and changing environmental relationships produce movement relative to things such as food, home and predators. You then call that organization navigation. I think that's legitimate. Where I don't follow you is the additional rule saying that comparable organization in a human cannot sometimes be called deciding. You even say that localized ganglia make "decisions" concerning muscular activity, although you distinguish those from conceptual or navigational decisions. So apparently the question isn't whether decision is inherently fictional. The question is what organization warrants applying the term. That's a much more interesting question. And I agree completely that "I decided to walk home" isn't a full description of the scene. It isn't supposed to be. "I navigated home" isn't either. Nor are "I recognized the street," "I remembered the route," or "I perceived the intersection." Accuracy and completeness aren't the same thing. If someone asks what happened in Hamlet, "Hamlet hesitates to avenge his father" is an extraordinarily incomplete description of the neural, physiological, experiential, social and historical reality involved. But its incompleteness doesn't make hesitation merely poetic. It identifies an organization relevant to the level we're trying to understand. So I think we're converging on the real issue: not whether higher-level words compress reality—they obviously do—but what makes a particular compression track a sufficiently stable and useful organization in reality rather than merely decorate the story. That's the criterion I'd be interested in developing. -------------------- rahz comfort pleasure power love truth awareness peace I am I feel I do I love I speak I see I know To shrink a person's vocabulary is to shrink their capacity to think.
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redgreenvines Kaptain Obvious đź‘€ Registered: 04/08/04 Posts: 47,373 |
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the disposition is all the accumulated relevant potential perceptive reflexes that a person may have faced with a situation. (i.e. the person's aggregate experience) the only direction is how it is faced (coming or going, left or right)
the context evokes the relevant perceptive reflex (i.e. access to memory is contextual - which is to say that at each point in navigation, an animal's familiarity is contextually activated) thus any disposition (which may refer to 1000 different relevant personal recollections, thoughts, responses) is both personal and contextual - the personal part is experience that has accrued, and the context is the current situation which activates resting memory. this is different than saying that the context conditions the disposition, it evokes all of the relevant memories and familiarity engages and reacts. -------------------- _
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Rahz Alive Again Registered: 11/11/05 Posts: 11,433 |
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Janus says: That helps. Given your definition of disposition, I'll withdraw "directed disposition" because we're using disposition differently.
You're using it for something like the accumulated repertoire of potentially relevant perceptive reflexes acquired through experience. Then the current context selectively reactivates portions of that repertoire. I don't have an objection to that model. But I think it actually makes the distinction I'm trying to draw easier to locate. Your account seems roughly: accumulated disposition → current context → relevant patterns activated → behavior Suppose my accumulated disposition contains experiences supporting both possibilities at the bus stop. I've previously waited successfully for late buses. I've also given up on buses and walked home. I'm cold, I know the route home, I have somewhere to be, the bus is forty minutes late, etc. Current context can therefore activate multiple relevant patterns bearing differently upon what happens next. The entire disposition isn't directed toward walking home. I agree. But something still distinguishes the condition in which I remain oriented toward waiting from the condition, perhaps thirty seconds later, in which I am oriented toward leaving and begin walking home. That's the organization I've been trying to identify. We don't have to call it "directed disposition." And calling it "will" doesn't require adding another mechanism to your model. I'm interested in what we call the changing person-level organization produced as context selectively activates accumulated experience and behavior becomes oriented toward one presently perceived possibility rather than another. If your answer is simply that contextual activation itself is sufficient to describe everything occurring, that's a coherent position. But then I think our disagreement is increasingly terminological rather than mechanistic. You describe accumulated experience being selectively reactivated by context and producing context-sensitive behavior. I describe some organizations within that process as wanting, intending, deciding and willing. To show that those descriptions are wrong, rather than merely descriptions you prefer not to use, we'd need some criterion by which "memory," "perception," "familiarity," "disposition" and "navigation" successfully track psychological organization while "intention" and "decision" do not. That's still the part I'm looking for. -------------------- rahz comfort pleasure power love truth awareness peace I am I feel I do I love I speak I see I know To shrink a person's vocabulary is to shrink their capacity to think.
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redgreenvines Kaptain Obvious đź‘€ Registered: 04/08/04 Posts: 47,373 |
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the part that is missing is the part that converts the inaction to action.
this missing part could occur at any time. consider this then as the person who is aware, like all people are, of their condition and their thoughts and feelings. and like all people, the person, while waiting for the bus, experiences shifts in their awareness, notable as changes among mental contents (being signals conveying sensations, feelings, and perceptions/thoughts). the person is not aware of what is unchanging for the most part, as unchanging signals (both bottom up sensory and top down from memory) are automatically suppressed, favoring our evolved natural way of detecting threats and opportunities, which move, appear, make noises or cause pain or pleasure, or otherwise represent change. so the context itself establishes the accessibility of a range of acquired memory of experiences that are context relevant. many of those memories would not be accessible in a different context. but what triggers action is a shift in awareness. the shift could be visual, detected movement, or auditory -sound, feeling etc. but it even may be the sudden dawning of the meaning of an earlier conversation that the person had been intermittently mulling over. The awareness of that change may lead to a perceptive reflex that may start the whole process of leaving the bus stop. I am trying to illustrate that the continuum of experience proceeds contextually but the familiarity or navigational response will follow awareness and awareness follows changes among mental content. (note at no point does will or decision come into this) If I had to say what the immediate cause of any action was, I would have to say it is awareness, and the cause of that awareness is change, any change of any type among mental contents(, which in our case, neurologically, is the aggregate of all cortical neurons in active feedback with the thalamus) -------------------- _
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sudly Quasar Praiser Registered: 01/05/15 Posts: 14,820 |
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The terms decision and action weren't used in the abstract.
It also didnt say adaptive control, it said,
And,
And self evaluation was referring to,
And,
But again, without the full text its hard to properly contextualise. If you dont think theres free will, but are still using the term will to mean, "the presently organized direction toward potential action, whether or not circumstances ultimately permit its expression." Then will is just a description of the organisation that precedes action? So more like orientation. And for describing mental orientation before action, I dont think the term 'will' has any meaningful neuroscientific depth to it. -------------------- I am whatever Darwin needs me to be.
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