I've had this discussion with qman already. I even sourced some studies for him, on the causes of irregular human migration:
shivas.wisdom said:
qman said:
shivas.wisdom said: So, how would you block arrivals and deport the rest?
Turn around ships and people at the border, that would discourage further attempts.
Deporting isn't that complicated, it's all in the open.
Except it is complicated.
People already risk their lives multiple times on the various routes into Europe - how much more deterrent will the threat of being turned around actually have? Let’s look at one study:
Quote: III. Does detention deter new arrivals?
This briefing paper takes its cue from critical analyses of the criminal justice field to question the foundations of detention policy in migration settings. This section critiques the myth that domestic border control policies such as detention are effective in eliminating unwanted migration.
More restrictive border controls do not reduce arrival numbers Scholars agree that restrictive border control measures focused on deterrence do not have a lasting impact on the number of arrivals but rather result in changes to the ways in which migration occurs. This is because migration is a complex social process that extends well beyond the reach of domestic border control policies. Czaika and de Haas, among many others, argue that “the effects of migration policies on immigration are relatively small compared to other social, economic, and political determinants.”13 Instead, restrictive measures introduce greater risks as people seek assistance from people smugglers and undertake more dangerous journeys.14 This is seen in the effects of more stringent border control measures in the United States that limit land-crossings along its southern border with Mexico:
Border enforcement has resulted in rechanneling flows of unauthorized migrants to more hazardous areas, raising fees charged by people-smugglers, and discouraging unauthorized migrants already in the US from returning to their places of origin. However, there is no evidence that the strategy is deterring or preventing significant numbers of new illegal entries...15
Immigration detention is one tool within a broader set of border control policies. Yet there is little research that specifically evaluates the effectiveness of detention in achieving deterrence outcomes. The author of one large international comparative study concluded “there is no empirical evidence to suggest that the threat of being detained deters irregular migration, or more specifically, discourages persons from seeking asylum … Detention is largely an extremely blunt instrument to counter irregular migration.”16
The Australian government similarly acknowledges detention does not deter new arrivals. During an inquiry by the Australian Human Rights Commission in 2014, the former and current Ministers for Immigration each stated under oath that holding children in detention does not deter new arrivals.17 The Australian Human Rights Commissioner subsequently questioned the basis of the country’s policy of mandatory detention, particularly for children.18 As the Australian Minister for Immigration had previously acknowledged in 2010:
We already have the toughest mandatory detention regime in the Western developed world, yet people still come to Australia… So I don't think mandatory detention should be seen as a deterrent.19
Reception policies have little influence on destination preference More broadly, numerous studies have attempted to establish those factors that most impact the destination choices of asylum seekers and refugees.20 According to this research, obtaining protection in a place of safety is the main aim of asylum seekers and refugees.21 Most asylum seekers have very limited or no understanding of the policies of destination countries before arrival and are often reliant on people smugglers to choose their destination.22 Choices, if any, are extremely limited and diminish further in acute situations when personal security is compromised.
Research has identified some themes despite this complexity. Rather than being influenced primarily primarily by immigration policies such as detention, those refugees who have some control over their destination prefer countries where they will be reunited with family or friends; they believe they will be in a safe, tolerant and democratic society; there are historical links between their country and the destination country; they can already speak the language of the destination country; or they believe they will be able to find secure work quickly due to general levels of prosperity.23
One major study compared asylum seeker numbers against key restrictive migration policies in 20 industrialised countries over a 14-year period. It found asylum seekers’ destinations are determined largely by historical, economic and reputational factors that cannot be influenced by immigration policy makers.24 The only domestic policy found to have any statistically significant impact on arrival numbers in more than one study was a reduction in the refugee recognition rate. However, this impact was small scale, of short duration and undermined the Refugee Convention.25
The research literature reveals a complex set of factors impact the destination outcomes of asylum seekers and irregular migrants. As Havinga and Bocker found:
It is not so much the characteristics of the countries of destination as the situation of the asylum-seekers or the circumstances of the flight which appear to determine the destination of the asylum-seeker's flight. The picture which emerges from this study is rather complex. No single or even restricted number of factors can explain the patterns of origin and destination for asylum seekers.26
This casts doubt on the effect of reception policies and other ‘pull factors’ on arrival numbers. Political claims about the effectiveness of hardline border control measures usually overlook contributing factors outside of the country, such as a global downturn in displaced populations or changes in the situation in countries of transit. Cause-and-effect arguments about domestic policies do not stack up against the evidence. Alternative explanations of migration variability are possible – and necessary – in order to adequately understand this phenomenon. Stable populations in countries of transit are less likely to pursue dangerous journeys More stringent border control policies have been ineffective in preventing the arrival and onwards transit of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants. As one expert on transit migration concluded:
Increasing restrictions in migration and asylum policy evidently do not stop or even diminish the flow of people, nor do they prevent their transit stay. Instead, restrictions have only managed to add to the human suffering without any real impact on migration flows.27
Indeed, most asylum seekers and irregular migrants who make it to a country of ‘transit’ do not complete their onwards journey due to a complex range of factors including, inter alia, perceived levels of risk, finances, state of health, social networks, availability of people smuggling and personal circumstances such as employment.28 As one author concluded:
Transit migration is characterized by ambiguity and rarely follows set plans. It is hard to predict its outcome. This makes it difficult to measure and quantify, or develop effective policy responses.29
However, it is clear that “being in transit is a condition of increased vulnerability, characterized by poverty, semi-protection, insecurity and social exclusion.”30 My own research built on such findings to conclude that irregular migrants and asylum seekers appear less likely to undertake onwards movement from a country of ‘transit’ if they:
- can meet their basic needs; - are not at risk of detention or refoulement; and - remain hopeful regarding future prospects.31
This is supported by the “common-sense conclusion” that better reception for asylum seekers and improved integration prospects will encourage asylum seekers to remain engaged with procedures in transit states.32
13 Czaika, M., and H. De Haas (2013). The effectiveness of immigration policies. Population and Development Review, 39(3) p. 503. 14 Cornelius, W.A. (2001) Death at the border: Efficacy and unintended consequences of US immigration control policy. Population and Development Review, 27, 661-685; Cornelius, W. A. (2005). Controlling 'unwanted' immigration: Lessons from the United States, 1993-2004. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 31(4), 775-794; Lutterbeck, D. (2006). Policing migration in the Mediterranean. Mediterranean Politics, 11(1), 59 – 82; Spijkerboer, T. (2007) The human costs of border control. European Journal of Migration and Law, 9, 127-139. 15 Cornelius (2001) p. 661. 16 Edwards, A. J. (2011) Back to Basics: The Right to Liberty and Security of Person and "Alternatives to Detention" of Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, Stateless Persons and Other Migrants, Geneva, UNHCR, p. v. 17 Australian Human Rights Commission. 2014. The Forgotten Children: National Inquiry into Children in Immigration Detention. Sydney: Australian Human Rights Commission. 18 Triggs, Gillian. 2014. "Human Rights Commission: Keeping asylum seeker children in detention doesn't stop people smugglers - so why do we do it?" The Sydney Morning Herald, 8th October 2014. 19 Owen, M. and T. Barrass. (2010). Getting tougher 'won't stop boats' says Chris Bowen. The Australian. November 2nd. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/getting- tougher-wont-stop-boats-says-chris-bowen/story- e6frg6nf-1225946353586 20 Crawley, H. (2010). Chance or choice? Understanding why asylum seekers come to the UK. London: UK Refugee Council; Day, K., & White, P. (2002). Choice or circumstance: The UK as the location of asylum applications by Bosnian and Somali refugees. GeoJournal, 56(1), 15-26; Gilbert, A. and Koser, K. (2006). Coming to the UK: What do asylum-seekers know about the UK before arrival? Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 32(7), 1209-1225; Havinga, T., & Bocker, A. (1999). Country of asylum by choice or by chance: Asylum-seekers in Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 25(1), pp 43-41; Holzer, T., Schneider, G., & Widmer, T. (2000). The impact of legislative deterrence measures on the number of asylum applications in Switzerland (1986-1995) International Migration Review, 34(4), 1182; Neumayer, E. (2004). Asylum destination choice: What makes some west European countries more attractive than others? European Union Politics, 5(2), 155-180; Richardson, R. (2010). Sending a message? Refugees and Australia's deterrence campaign Media International Australia (135), 7-18; Robinson, V., and Segrott, J. (2002). Understanding the decision-making of asylum seekers. London: Home Office; Thielemann, E. (2004). Does Policy Matter? On Governments' Attempts to Control Unwanted Migration. UC San Diego: Center for Comparative Immigration Studies. 21 Robinson and Segrott (2002). 22 Day and White (2002); Gilbert and Koser (2006); Havinga and Bocker (1999); Robinson and Segrott (2002). 23 Black, R., Collyer, M., Skeldon, R., and Waddington, C. (2006). Routes to illegal residence: A case study of immigration detainees in the United Kingdom. Geoforum, 37(4), 552-564; Havinga and Boecker (1999); Neumayer (2004); Robinson and Segrott (2002). 24 Thielemann, (2004). 25 Havinga and Bocker (1999); Neumayer (2004); Thielemann (2004). 26 Havinga & Bocker (1999). 27 Papadopoulou-Kourkoula, A. (2008). Transit Migration: The Missing Link Between Emigration and Settlement. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan p. 149. 28 de Haas, H. (2008). Irregular migration from West Africa to the Maghreb and the European Union: An overview of recent trends. Geneva: International Organization for Migration; Papadopoulou-Kourkoula (2008). 29 Papadopoulou-Kourkoula (2008) p. 141. 30 Papadopoulou-Kourkoula (2008) p. 141. 31 Sampson, R. C., Mitchell, G., & Bowring, L. (2011). There are alternatives: A handbook for preventing unnecessary immigration detention. Melbourne: International Detention Coalition. 32 Field, O., & Edwards, A. (2006). Alternatives to detention of asylum seekers and refugees. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
Here's a tl;dr - https://www.odi.org/publications/10558-europe-s-refugees-and-migrants-hidden-flows-tightened-borders-and-spiralling-costs
Quote: The European response to the current migration ‘crisis’ has been swift. Since 2014, at least €17 billion has been spent on deterring refugees and migrants through tighter border controls and bilateral agreements, such as the EU-Turkey deal. These measures have been effective in reducing flows – as few as 330,000 refugees and migrants are likely to arrive in Europe this year via the Mediterranean through ‘overt’ routes.
However, Europe will still see 890,000 asylum applications in 2016. This discrepancy between overt arrivals and asylum applications shows that there are many people whose journeys to Europe we know little about. Border controls have, in many cases, simply rerouted refugees and migrants towards alternative, ‘covert’ routes.
As a result of the analysis in this report, we conclude that Europe needs a new approach. It needs to shift from an emphasis on controlling and deterring migration, towards a pragmatic and effective approach to manage it better. This report makes four key policy recommendations:
- European governments should facilitate and increase legal pathways so that they can monitor and more effectively manage flows of refugees and migrants.
- A new global alliance of migration and displacement data is needed.
- Governments should commit to more transparency on deterrence costs, as well as the significant reception and procedural costs in both national and EU budgets.
- Forge new international and regional coalitions built around common interests and objectives that aim to ensure safe, controlled and well-managed migration.
So please, be more specific. How will you effectively deter irregular human migration?
Unfortunately, his response was dismissive:
qman said: The study doesn't like the fact that nations might use border enforcement and deportation to stop the flow of migrants. The people that put out this study are BIASED, "that is about irrational as you can get".
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