Don't bristle so much Rahz. Its all insinuation, after all.
I would argumentatively add that material substance is metaphysical concept of physical reality that can be deconstructed.
The general statement of adjascent and isomorphic categories of physical and material reality, is consistant down to modern analysis, where matter is clearly a partial aspect of what is understood more holistically as matter in its states, (as DQ quoted Feynman) or what we also call the singular morphology of matter/energy, (physics/physis).
The extent to which matter/energy is coherent to represent as a material "thing", as a theoretical object or in a matter of inquiry (etc) is consistent with the moderners idea of physical reality. It is alot of impressions from the history of philosophy informing this idea of one " thing". But this thing arguably cannot be stated, because its states are just one thing, which physis as a whole is not.
Because this idea of physis has in spite of its original conception been drawn by the broad aegis and projects of categorically derivative materialism, namely the assumptions in the way things are represented singly as such states in analysis, it is often believed today that there is a physical reality or realism that is equivocally materiality. That seems a reasonable enough suggestion. But the philosopher will always point out materiality is (again) what is found in a particular mode of analysis of states, and physical reality is prior to this. On recognition of this (particularly in the originally conceived context, which has nothing to do with how it is claimed today) materialism has sometimes rightly been called a dogma of reductionism. Why do we seek reality in the tiniest colliding parts of things? This projection of analysis, (analuein means "unloosen") leads to a commonly mistaken notion that physical reality is a predicate, something possible to find in methodological pursuit of knowledge.
Quite arguably, though, this is not something that can be known. This is why other philosophers have "stated" Matter/energy "is" its morphological states, or in other words "something" so to speak, that is understood always in its form. Formality in regard to nature, such as our formality and methodology in seeking knowledge, does not assert idealism, or let alone the disposition that there are "two substances" matter and form, but that a monistic concept is subject either to conjecture or cannot possibly be known as such. We dwell in interpretations of questions, much more than answers.
This is possibly why (if there needs to be a "reason"), the asserted concepts break down according to their own provisions sometimes. Cartesian dualism, the even more convoluted polarized notion that there are "two" substances, is a good example of something to take apart, since it is based on what we can aptly recognize as a purely "formalistic" duality of matter and form. It is interesting that at we indeed dwell in the "reality" and realism of Cartesianism, which is so easily questioned if not taken apart
I would say in a certain formal philosophical way, matter/energy, or what we regard as physical phenomena, cannot "just" (in the sense of having a just rationale) be a material thing, for obvious reasons. This can be clearly seen, whether it is found questionable by assuming such a principle of philosophical formality, that what we know is analysis of morphological states, or even according to the rigid modern epistemic project, which asserts its so called "states of affairs" with some similar circumspection (for instance as in the quote, Feynman recognizes).
The question to me is whether one remains under the whole conceptual aegis which is partial to certain idealizations of analytic concepts being benignly but more and more often pitted against themselves (is matter and energy possible to represent in material representation?) or whether this epistemic project is more aptly deconstructed. I tend to lean toward the latter gesture.
What is physis? Suppose it is not what we represent it as, being, ousia, substance, but what the Greeks knew as the causa sui of growth or becoming. That is the insinuation of life.
PS. To the OP I hope this is useful. I did read your thesis and while I am not clear on some things, I am wondering are you impressed at all by Spinoza per chance? I have been putting off a reading of his ethics, wherein he asserts a particular notion of monistic substance. I am not sure I agree with a substance monism per se, but I have also been wanting an oppurtunity to make a reading of the text. Anyways cheers, and looking forward to any exchange.
Edited by Kurt (05/25/15 11:26 PM)
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