Linguistic Philosophy

We don't differ on a particular theory of perceptual experience of objects. I am talking about doing decent epistemology, from the ground up.

Where we differ is in this. You begin with a theory and conjecture, and concept of what perceptual experience is, like what you posted above. You point to that, as "perceptual experience", and as perception as implicitly contained in a theoretical concept. You seem to me to completely overlook the actual epistemological basis, which you allude to in this way.

I think I understand what you are intending to "imply" pretty clearly now. The theory or concept you suggest is something that can be considered conceptually and structurally resembling positions people take in a natural way when they are doing epistemology, (discussing perceptions, conjectures, and the grounds of knowledge), which you allude to and sometimes claim grounds in.

The problem is that the open interpretation in your science, for instance, a discourse between Bohm and Copenhagen, is not just implying the conjecture of epistemology, which to the contrary is supposed to be, and is naturally open discourse. The openness of a possibility (contingency of perceptions and propositions about the) is prior to being a projected belief of one sort or another in epistemology. This openness is just the sciemtific discourse as such. Having a belief, and generally comporting yourself with a view and interpretation of the world, however technically justified on the work of scientists, is not the same thing as that.

You say I am Copenhagian, or that I am an idealist. What arguments have I made in this sense? To be completely honest, since I do mot hold these views, I think you just say things like that because I am being critical of you. You are making strawmen. I am not Copenhaganian, or Bohmian, just as I am not a realist or an idealist. I am not taking positions, in that game, where one thing by conceptual structure implies another thing. I think it is only possible to take those views surrounding epistemology in modern science, once you are honestly grounded in epistemology itself and work outwards. You begin with actual sense experiences of your own, and meet conjecture in honest terms, rather than attempt to imply or allude to something in concepts you identify with.

It reminds me of alot of big talkers around, often arguing with each other in ideological terms. Isn't there a problem when people take positions in science to inform their epistemology? You always hear about Deepok Chopra. Or is that fair game? Maybe it is fair game, I don't know, but this kind of talk is all over the place and comes from both ways and in different directions. There are cases that are arguably just as bad, like with Richard Dawkins, who just as well, as scientist, also appropriates science as too broad a narrative and concept which results in bad epistemology, essentially a kind of way of trying to trick people into identifying with a conception. However technically correct the view may be, this will always be bad epistemology. Richard Dawkins is a good scientist, but he is a piss poor epistemologist. That is just how it goes when people say absurd things.

What the Dawkinsesque thinker constantly misses, is it is possible in most cases to be neither one thing or another, not holding one world view or another, in one's beliefs, since they come down less to something we really hold in concepts, and more to our broad purview of experience, and contingent expression of arguments.

What is contingency? It can be narrowly defined as language is in use, rather than in conceptuality. Also, instead of having the "right beliefs", and constantly feeling one has to assert something, it is possible to just do decent epistemology, by being careful of what you outwardly assert, and what you do not. It is not necessary to project beliefs. To the prospect of science, this doesn't mean having the "right beliefs", or concepts; it means conceding preconceived ideas, beginning with your own perceptual experience, and meeting discussion, as a general practice. For some this will blossom into particular views of the natural world, for others it just means shedding beliefs and dwelling in an openness, without view.

Feel free to be a "Bhohmian", but I think you can understand as well, I do not take these oppositional positions you ascribe to me. If you can respect the true neutrality of science, then I will find that respectable myself.

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