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InvisibleKurt
Thinker, blinker, writer, typer.

Registered: 11/26/14
Posts: 1,688
Cartesianism and Violence
    #23941901 - 12/19/16 10:27 PM (7 years, 1 month ago)

Is Cartesianism, mind and body, or a subject to object relation, a kind of violence?

I believe it is, when the characteristic detachment to a present object is contextually situated, or is seen in actuality to grow out of an implicit involvement with nature and its entities. I think maybe I can try to explain this.

I would assume an understanding of our "present" situation can only be possible in this sensibility by giving a genetic historical account, as exhaustively as possible. Admittedly I find what I am able to do, and make clear, is only in the smallest gesture, and a basic analysis. I guess that means this will be a long post, with modest content, but hopefully it might be considered a contribution to the forum.

I don't expect anyone to respond to me in point on this, by the way, but I would like to suggest the notion, more openly as a question, or "questioning" to anyone who finds a question which may intimately concern our world, compelling. My response to the question, is yes, Cartesianism is a kind of philosophically endorsed violence, and the particular response to it I would propose is deconstructive.

I would assume that what is spoken of as an endearing concept, such as an adopted linguistic context, is sometimes just generally pragmatic. People’s novel experiences, and ways of being are not something I want to question, here. But it also seems important from another priority to avoid the entrenchment of bad ideas, or “bad science”, which is the back and forth of all contemporary western philosophy, seemingly, however deep people go into it. Typically I do not think that endorsement of science, goes deep enough.

We also have pragmatism. To be pragmatic might also be to say, that reflecting on our language use, our concepts, allows us to overcome some hangups like for instance, subject and object, and mind and body, which are also complicit concepts of our modern world more broadly. We can talk about linguistic sentences and their "correspondence" to the world, rather than subject and object, for instance, to a great degree, in more pragmatic ways. I agree with the notion, but I am not sure how I could beyond a generality. I would note, (as Rorty did) a language is just the new projected ideal, or post hoc justification of a mental experience it comes drawn from, in this sense, but does not disclose in these terms. Correspondence allows for other potentials of language (which are not correspondence theories) but it is basically the subject object relation in another package.

So as for pragmatism, it seems like on the plus side, as analysts have argued, it would be better to talk about linguistic practices, and the concepts and notions we have, and practically work with these, rather than mind body issues. But on the other hand, to think that analyses and practices around language necessarily put aside mind and body dualisms, by assuming these hardly disguised dualist terms, would be a bad assumption. It seems to me, to a large degree, linguistic/conceptual approach, is just a kind of further entrenchment in assumptions sometimes.

I do not think there is some ideal or pure reference. It seems to me that languages more or less develop contingent to history, and the novel idea or paradigm is to all extent and purposes, a metaphor that emerged that is gradually accepted as reality - if language theories do get beyond being replacements for  "mental mediums". I always liked Nietzsche's line, because it describes the revolutionary idea as it really is:

Quote:


What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms—in short, a sum of human relations which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are; metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous power; coins which have lost their pictures and now matter only as metal, no longer as coins.




What I like about Nietzsche's description, is as he describes metaphors, once they have worn out their sensuous power, that is precisely when they are most established as the paradigm of a normal economy and context of exchange. Metaphors are the revolutionary idea of tomorrow, to become eventually worn and outdated concept as soon as it is accepted. The metaphor, in an ordinary context, is what breaks the rule of a language. This is how I think we should treat many concepts, if we think directly upon them. I think in a marginal way, it is a good outlet, better than trying to fit things into categories. When it comes to Descartes, the modern western concept of mind and body, this is how I think of his conceptions, are in one sense, in their arbitrariness.

One active topic here, is on the pineal gland, referred to as the material counterpoint, to a philosophy which ascribes a passage between “mind and body”. It was Descartes who in the 17th century called the pineal gland “the seat of the soul”. Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy still has an entry on this. I have not looked at it, but maybe there is some history of not so great ideas there:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pineal-gland/

This is pseudo-science. I think what is sometimes missed in critiques of a “pseudo science” though, is that a simple analysis of material structures as proof, never addresses the reason the notion and is sought. In fact, both materialists and idealists seek this reconciliation if we look at the terms. Sometimes it seems like a material justification is sought in a broader constellation of ideas, which inform that we look for something like this, or ground a more abstract theory, in one way or another, and this may remain generally as impetus. Historically and to this day, this background impetus, to something being sought, is generally accepted. It is not just the persistent sentimentality of idealism that informs the particular ideal. It is not the mistaken arrogant assumptions belonging to a "materialist" in appropriating the world. It is neither of these things alone.

Why do we value the “I think”, “cogito”, cognition, as though it were a “thing” (res cogitan)? Why do we value these rationalizations, the particular “cognitivism” of our culture as an idea, where we are relating to a mental “thing”, a mind, or consciousness, and indulging the idea that this has any empirical or material basis to resolve? People say they question this philosophical dualism, one way, or they synthesize a philosophical impetus with whatever terms and mistakes in what they call more organic terms, but they do not often question the informing terms, which say to look for the mental “thing” to begin with. When someone says to look for something that can't be found, in so many cases, they remain in the seeking attitude.

The broader set of assumptions are firmly and genetically situated in western culture in many ways; but not per se, in terms of any particular proposition, or knowledge, not like "the seat of the soul". But when examined, these background assumption are not any better or more grounded as a floating whole, than the specific idea or any other material structure, bridging the mind and body, in such a proposition we hold place for. When someone like Richard Rorty comes along and rejects the existence of the mind, as an “invention”, in its usual rationalization, and likewise to finally say it is not worth the candle to think of anymore, I think mostly I agree.

Here is an orthodox assumption: It is said that mind and matter, a metaphysical question, is a "hard" problem that will never be solved, but somehow, it is implied by the way we think of the world in general. We have no problem talking about and resolving the difference between a “subject” and “object” though, for instance. Why? This is western philosophy in a nutshell. In a positive sense we prioritize something, affirm it, because it has “something to do with what we know”, right? Truth. And where do we begin but with the terms of what we know? Or is it that philosophy begins with being pressed up to the ledge of bad assumptions?

We accept the idea of a conscious “subject” (a subject has traditionally been stated as the basis of knowledge) only if it is abstracted, and in effect, constantly. A subject is something in the world, in a sensibility, and is like the way we talk about other subject matters, and other investigations of the natural world, which we seek to understand and know. But it is "itself" not something we investigate, like other subjects. Consciousness is a special subject, and when people start accepting and equivocating this standard, as basis, that is where we get bad assumptions.

It is possible that by following Descartes, due to his inconsistent system, we talk about a subject as the “mode” (ie. mentality) of relation to an “object”, paradigmatically. This is its concept, we know. A subject in this sense may be what is questioned, but not in regards to what it is, like other subjects in the world. It is questioned or interrogated rather, according to its deferred experience of the world (an object) in an empirical standard. This relation lays bear the possibility of any knowledge whatsoever, following Descartes’ assumptions and becomes “necessary” in all our considerations.

Since the world used to be found mainly in its subject, directly, and it was subjects we came up to, we still preserve that standard of knowledge (the natural world) but add another consideration. Rather than treating a subject as something natural, and part of the physical world, we so to say, come to its “door” and question it, or interrogate it, and demand entry. Our mode of “interrogation” of subjective experiences is consequently considered routine and necessary, to get to any subject in the world in front of us (now considered its empirical object). We find this a necessary demand, on our door, because the subject, we know, its place and grew out of the western philosophy's perennial comportment with nature, where "subjects" were indeed substances, or things in themselves, “subject matters” (hypokeimenon “underlying thing”) and this comportment, will always be our way, in the world that opened itself sublimely to the naturalist’s eye.

Where we ourselves become subjects, "things" we first set out a safe place, and then demand entry; we ourselves become this opening, and consequently this demand for opening, to content of the world. However it is put, (whether even Hegel got it right), without ado, we accept this equivocation of the meaning of a subject as bearing the openness and access to nature, even if in bearing the meaning of openness and accessibility, perception begins to be (as subjectivity) what obtrudes.

This is not a true phenomenological investigation, without pointing to this closing of access, and separation. It is just the "necessary" pathology of westerners who cut themselves off from nature, forget their roots, and find that a natural relation can subsequently only be found in challenging and demanding something forward, to the extent that if given a choice, probably they would prefer this. When Aristotle said that anything was a subject so far as it was a “thing” from natural phenomena to a book that opens itself, the thing opened itself from itself, in a way that we could not explain, and knowledge of nature, physis, was sublime to all greeks. To Aristotle, a “thing” in its thingness, or a substantive being or entity, showed itself, from itself. Subjects are just like they are as beginnings of sentences sentences, books containing knowledge, or natural phenomena (abstract or concrete objects - but always ultimately designated as substantive to nature) that open themselves. As Descartes, questions the sense, or rather puts it in a place to be interrogated, he needs to do a dance to justify a completely different rationalistic structure, a “mental thing”, (justified so far as it is bearing the general possibility of knowledge of the world) as thing, and as he incorporates this justification, as the general possibility of knowledge, its foundation, in a positive sense, apparently, all subsequent philosophy overlooks that what he designates is not an empirical object or a thing, perhaps it is what is most questionable of all. Thus we do not inquire, we interrogate for meaning. This becomes the mode of a transcendental subject, the opening or access to nature, remains the only source of relation, but limited to the standard of empirical,  which is justified in projectionality of epistemological structures; subject and object.

It is impossible to naturalize what in Descartes’ terms was never coherent. He originally calls the internal experience, a thing, but in spite of coming to it, as indubitable, in terms of a line of doubt, it was not an empirically observable itself. "I think", is not a concrete empirical observation of a “thing”, actually, and a conclusion "I am" is drawn from an assumption, if it is not itself what Informed I think, completely circularly. All Cartesian rationalizations are essentially circular even as it becomes the purportedly robust ground of all empirical observations, as the subject object (sense) relationships. These as just mentioned, are only possible in broadly equivocating the meaning of a subject, as two different things. We work in those terms, as far as we find them consistent, in terms of knowledge, and obviate the inconsistency of metaphysics.

That seems to be enough we figure, because, in a positive sense, bearing the world as radically alterior and posterior to us, and radically different, allows a kind of demanded access to things, which we seem to prefer. A domain to more prevailingly dictate, as human beings, is perhaps inevitably what from the beginning, was broached, as things. The efficient control and domain of a subject object relation, is perhaps an improvement, from just relating to nature, and its subjects, which already bared themselves enough. To describe this, as a narrative, is perhaps striking anyone as ascribing too much intelligibility to these occurrences, of human nature, but perhaps that will be forgiven. The narrative in a skeptical sense, is how western philosophers learn to pack all metaphysical assumptions they have in what they consider the implicit and necessary structure to positivistic knowledge. 

In the broadest sense what is a "subject" then? It could be said it is almost directly comported violence. We are “subject” above all as passive or receiving, and dictated, by the objective world. We are subject insofar as what we experience is marginal, always the object of designation, never the subject of communication. The objective world as “nature”, is supposedly this oppressive, to some people, and we do not exaggerate to confirm what can be projected this way. But this is a relation nonetheless, even as one-sided as it may seem. So a conscious subject in this sense has its inherent mysteries; (it is said) as its apparent freedom, or as mentioned its basic “specialness”, among other subjects, so far as it in fact must in some aspect (to exist at all) necessarily escape the pure economy of the leveling of all things to the quantitative empirical generality that it is subordinated to. For instance, a subjective mental experience in the world, as a relation to an object, is said to have a substantive qualitative experience in something like “the redness of the color red”, or “pleasure” or “pain”, things that at a point, we can only describe as raw qualitative experience, however close we can pinpoint how the brain structures may “light up” in showing us these experiences.

The qualitative or subjective experience is the point where physically objective reduction comes to a baseline and grounds out. Where the experience can’t be further analyzed or defined, an experience is subjective, and generally, this is seen in the general terms we comport ourselves to the world (the mentioned subject to object relations) as constitutive of our experience as a whole from the level ground up. Like Descartes said (when he doubted the external world) initially we come from what we assume in our senses, through doubt of what we assume, to finally wrest what we know, as a rational structure, in the way we inquire in general. The circularity, or interrogation of experience, is the grounds of certainty in one sense, the indubitable proposition, or the foundation of knowledge,  even though as we know in this whittling down and squeezing of the world of experience, we come to what escapes this tyranny of “knowledge”, as a subject. Again, conventionally, (and with whatever dogmas) we only question this subject as an entity, not as like other subject matters, so we “question” it, rather than inquire to it as we might understand.

Causally, in a similar way, go through the assumptions. We figure sometimes mental events supervene in the world, (I think, to move my arm, and fingers to type words, with whatever subserving physical structures, this if anything at all is mental activity) but at the same time, so far as we idealize and project a pursuit of absolute knowledge, this can happen for just as plausibly predetermined reasons, the chemical reactions and neurological economies, behavioristic relations to a surrounding environment. What description we rely on could seemingly be chosen without any fallacy, apparently to project these common sense baselines of physical and mental, respectively and usually with one in relation TO the other. We find this reasonable, in terms of what we can presently rationalize as a pursuit of knowledge as a totality, which is what we have our complicit assumptions about which we project as our positions in perennial discussions (a historicity that is unexamined). As long as our priority to know stands out, as first priority, we have both common sense, and idealized terms to speak in, implied by a general "subject" (with a respective phenomenal object) of physics, and chemistry and biology, not just as concepts, but in the gravitation around speculated terms of what they can and can’t explain in their object schema.

The opening of sensation, subject as a “relation” or mode, is arguably not just something we are going to figure out, or ever even sincerely ask of at all, in these schematics, but in an equal economy, a constant epistemological equivocation. A "subjective" experience of red, merely stands for whatever we don’t happen to objectively quantify, whatever we don’t articulate in a true subject matter. We come circle and say because this general relation of subject to object is necessary for knowledge, we can call statements which are broadly consistent with knowledge, in these abstractions, as knowledge (as a philosophically proved “subject”). Pragmatically and to certain effect this works, and is what people expect, and find to be most reasonable. At the same time, it is if bared in its related terms, it is indeed a completely fabricated invention, without any ground other than circularity, or some kind of arrogance or hubris of western philosophers, to find a pursuit of knowledge projected outwardly according to the seeming "line" of Descartes’ initial reasoning.

The question is, if you trace this way of thinking, in all its implications and back and forth, is this speculation, of a “pineal gland”, as the seat of the soul, to a “cogito”, or to its epistemological generalization as a “subject” (and if you give the full genetic account coming through to the present treatment of a linguistic concept, as a media, and “information science”) are you either just dragged along, by a history of bad understandings, but understand the contingency of these developments, and recognize as a whole, the problem. Are these concepts, useful as they are, any better than pseudo-science itself? Is Cartesianism not itself as a whole pseudo-science? Sure maybe we should be affirmative philosophers we should talk about language and concept, but what about this tradition that keeps accruing and building upon bad assumptions, bad faith, bad rationale, and bad ethics?

What it takes to come to terms with the world today, is not again pointing out the pseudoscience, but a deconstruction of the total constellation, the epistemological equivocations which are broadly accepted, that accompany this ideal. The question nobody asks, is why the word “subject” has equivocal meaning. Yet we are complicit to accept this meaning, and walk around and think of consciousness as it constructs knowledge and vice versa. Accepting of equivocal meaning for a moment, is post-modernity, while the deconstruction, and radical reconsideration of tradition is something people can draw out more or less appropriately to a setting. I say, be pragmatic or constructivist, take a scientific attitude, but feel free to dwell in your own notions, and when you can criticize the prejudices that are handed down and supposed to be accepted as given. It is in more than one dimension than idealist and materialist; it is history now. Or another alternative, is as Rorty argues; learn to see language, and concept as something which does not "mediate" reality mainly through its correspondence.


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InvisibleLunarEclipse
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Re: Cartesianism and Violence [Re: Kurt]
    #23942407 - 12/20/16 04:16 AM (7 years, 1 month ago)

I agree.



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Anxiety is what you make it.


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InvisibleKurt
Thinker, blinker, writer, typer.

Registered: 11/26/14
Posts: 1,688
Re: Cartesianism and Violence [Re: LunarEclipse]
    #23942857 - 12/20/16 09:47 AM (7 years, 1 month ago)

A less formal way of putting it; could be that we overload the temporal basis of the present, or "presence".

Consider all the entities that are formally considered as what is "present at hand". We have subjects, or the substantial matters, and issues we are supposed to understand.

These become our relation and commitment to their "objects" though (subject object sense relations) which are constantly expressed. Then, this means we become subjects, and we are supposed to engage in these relations and question ourselves, and others (in our subjective experieces) to arrive at the content of any subject/object.

The presence of the world, could also be packed into the languages we use, the "paradigms" and conceptual frameworks, of what is, or the way we talk about objects in theoretical complexes which goes beyond even classical spatiotemporal objects, to correspond with the entities we call facts. For instance evolution - genetic decent  and change - is a fact, while Darwinian natural selection, as an explanation is a theoretical justification for this fact, implied in the background. It is the conservative basis of the fact of evolution, but not necessarily the exhaustive explaination of the standing of  the "fact".

And my question was; is this philosophical violence? Maybe violence began when Aristotle designated the Natural world as its "thing" its "subject", the manifest form which gives itself over in inteligibility and engagement in the first place

If I consider this just a remark on the way "things" are (I am an Aristotelian myself, as much as I believe that evolution is a fact on a conservative basis of natural selection...) but this does not seem to say whether ethically I would recognize anything occuring at all, in saying a thing is a thing. But when I attempt to describe all these relations, one growing out of the next, beyond "the present" of an aging historical presence, it is difficult to miss the degree of violence in each abstraction of things. Each abstraction is like stuffing and loading the world into a singular present, or sense of "what is", with additional forms of content. A subject or thing is what is, but an object is too though, and so is a fact, or what has increasingly been called "information" lately.

Anyway it is just a thought or reflection on the present. I took Descartes as particularly exemplary of violence.  Take the empirical-scientific standard itself, but not just bearing as facts or information, but in how it was conceived prior to being an institution. Since we follow Descartes' model of rationalism, an idea the senses are generally justifiable to doubt (which becomes the particular way of interrogating sense experience) this way of eliciting objects molds into a demand of the sensible entities implicitly. This doesn't just refer to our demand for the natural world in certain enframed terms. We dissimulate ourselves, to say that every experience is in this realm of possibility (in doubt) of either being a complete delusion, or hallucination, or what is founded in the senses. As this becomes a criterion for reality, we do not much consider if it is realistic, to act in organic ways as if our senses are accurate or not. More likely the intelligibility of experience does not fit into this mode of corresponding to the homogenous experiential datums, and the complicit norms of existing conceptual paradigms, and we really experience what we do. In other words, in a cartesian world it is as if we want a standard of distinguishing truth and falsity so much, we assume the senses are true and false. So the irreal, must situate the real, and no doubt the real pays its heed to the hyperreal the inflation of the present.

I don't suppose this makes sense or is particular true, in laying out these formal ideas. What I was thinking, after listening to a radio program recently on "our age"; was that we have three temporal extacies. Previously I thought mostly there were two, in the present, the historical development, (past and future). This is what I would be, to your amusement surely, attempting to describe. But it strikes me there is another temporal extacy which would be age.

An age would be something likke the way a day goes by so fast when you are young, but it is so much of your life. Or it would be like when you get older things slow down. Whether myh cat is younger than me in number of years and history, at the same time 15 or so years of age to a cat, is old in age. I was wondering the other day, if what we ascribe as the wisdom of elders is being in that temporal flow, rather than having a set of total experiences; a history in a technical sense. The formal stuff, on history and the overloaded present, seems accidental compared to the pacing rhythms of age itself. I don't think historical deconstruction, or more pragmatic language is necessarily a solution to the problems of the present, but maybe it is somehow looking for grounds in age.

Just a thought on the way of life though, I guess.


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InvisibleKurt
Thinker, blinker, writer, typer.

Registered: 11/26/14
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Re: Cartesianism and Violence [Re: Kurt]
    #23944144 - 12/20/16 05:44 PM (7 years, 1 month ago)

What is our age?

Okay. Well I like Pink Floyd, and get the reference, now that I think about it. The first question is of that "special" divide and distinction of philosophers. In my experience there seems to be two approaches to dealing with these. One is the philosophical equivalent of dynamite, and the other is more protracted. Most things you can't just approach with dynamite anyway.

A philosophical distinction is actually easily passable as much as it builds up though. Maybe the thought I am having difficulty with; from this point of view, and attitude, (maybe a less headstrong approach to life in my age in some ways) is in dealing with what happens when you pass through walls, and supposed distinctions people live by. This is not dynamite. The consequence seems to be not in confronting a hard reality, but in part that "they" (the walls of the world) end up irrelevant, and so do you when you pass through.

I may be a bit younger, but I hear Radiohead song with that constant baseline, as my own, "I walk through walls...I float down a liffy."

Or to put another way, I find the poet Philip Larkin relatable when he says:

And once you have walked the length of your mind, what
You command is as clear as a lading-list
Anything else must not, for you, be thought
        To exist
And what 's the profit? Only that, in time
We half-identify the blind impress
All our behaving bear, may trace it home.
        But to confess.
On that green evening when our death begins,
Just what it was, is hardly satisfying,
Since it applied only to one man once,
        And that man dying.



My question, if I could raise one, would be how we pass through... the hard distinctions, the deep ideology, and education, life, etc which makes us or what we did, as a consequence unreal, if the notion makes sense. I don't think I will be able to present the ethical issue I intended here in clear terms, a straight forward critique. Instead, I think I should have titled this thread in a more positive way "On Age", which is not just some moment of violence in its problematics. And maybe I am projecting a bit, that an age is what we also just pass through.

I don't mean all the angst driven existential stuff necessarily. I would't say it is existential angst necessarily makes people distract themselves, in a constant stimulation (and simulation) of presence, and present moments. That's a particular theory, that itself projects, and this isn't so personal in my opinion. But if we do tend to constantly inflate and load the present with meaning, in our age, for whatever reason, and if we always are looking to this as "the present", I would say in a way we miss our age in these moments.

Maybe this does not necessarily need to be a critique mainly. Maybe what we do  needs to emphasize that the natural world just brings itself forward from another view in this way. I am not sure what the "present" is, and how consistent it is to what it "should be". But an age of philosophy is like spring and summer branches that grow and reach out to the Platonic sun, always up and out, always in progress, while at the same time partly, and then nearly fully, they conceal what they came of, in the denseness of foliage. The simple psychological expression would be that we forget, as we do in individual psychologies. And what is the new? If and when someone does assert value laden judgements, a flower refutes its previous way, just as much as a fruit refutes the flower, and the seed is only something outside of where it comes from, (for instance, in this Hegelian metaphor) and all we know of is that as a complete cycle which knows this as the separation. This in simple psychology, is a sentimental sensibility. To Nietzsche, a metaphor is also the new paradigm, pure creativity, which loses its sensuous value to become true, real and established, in its better worn exchanges but that is the path of all truths and armies of metaphors we dispatch. Like in the way we can hardly comprehend a collective version of our forgetting, we can hardly recognize what is in front of us in this way, by nature.

What if all our paradigms were originally these metaphors, and we just overlook this due to the seeming individuality of metaphorical existence, when we live in consensus reality, from which we constantly seem to forget? Will "they" call it sentimental to acknowledge this? A sentimentalist (some kind of overladenness we watch for as inner creators and poets) seems to be someone who looks back ultimately. We look back on our lives for some impress we made, only to find like Larkin, there is no general impress, and only our self creativity, which stands existentially. We fold things back and look at what is forgotten, what is the hardened stem and trunk, because that is what is most solid. We look to the conventional exchange. But what is it now, or in respect to now, is all we can ask. We can't question deeply, or question too much? I guess it seems right that we should in a positive way try to live in a present and its age, leaving some history forgotten and covered from one view.

Philosophically, what hardens up is what is most difficult to critique or question. It is sometimes unfathomable, to question, and only in the progress, of science, does it seem like we view any progress. A philosopher can emphasize it more maybe, affirming what it is, or what it seems to be, in order to question it. And it is what many controversial philosophers have said. There is an interesting connotation in the etymology of the word "modern", what we call our age. It is from latin "just now". It seems to me, modern world, or just now is supposed to made of some kind of "hard" or condensed, and packed reality, even as it endorses what it calls a present and increasingly disposable age in this. I do not mean to be too pessimistic about the way things go in this direction, more or less in themselves. Moral principles would have to be in specifics. But it is worth questioning, this unsustainable attitude. If we live in a "modern" way today, and we may surely forget yesterday, what do we live tomorrow? Is tomorrow modern too? Is there anything following what is modern? Isn't this modern attitude, something which deconstructs itself? Or is it to always be constantly stimulated, hard packed and disposable? I want to put this somewhere in line with a narrative, of this growth process, but I don't know what the constant ladening of the present would be. Maybe the idea of such a view or responsibility to history is impossible.

It seems like, unlike Hegel, who spoke of the end of history, and more like philosophers following him, we display things ourselves and let them fall apart, showing what it was in those things, that made them up, in philosophy. We look to a conscious subject today for instance, what Hegel called the spirit of our age. We look to a subject which in the most literal sense, if examined rightly, is equivocal. It has more than one usage and meaning, we grew out of. But I am bored with the idea of saying the way things are, saying what is true, about what seems to me to be untrue. When we have to be clear, and correct (true, and present), when someone asks to clarify particulars, I find I am pretty well able to. I would not attempt this associative approach to a question of clarification, for instance, of what do I mean by "presence" or the mechanics of a historical narrative, but it seems appropriate to realize that there is something that moves by itself, and the contingency of our language, just our metaphors to describe things. We do not describe any essential way of our own, or the way the world is. Is it to difficult to think on being? Well sure, and maybe it only comes in ironies to the philosopher. The irony might be that our "age" is as considerable temporal reality, as our present.

I might have said this, to my cat. Because across differences, I know a fifteen year old cat has understood age, in a way I can't, as any mere occurring and accruing of experience. I am older and younger, and of different and the same kind, as temporal being...

Okay, so I think I have flooded enough of my projected enough of my own ideas of things, to anyone if they read these posts. I do not assume it is all agreeable or sensible or anything at all, but I will leave my take as this.
Does anyone associate with any of these questions or critiques.
The original question was of "violence and thinking".
But I think a better question, is "What is our age...?"


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Invisiblesudly
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Registered: 01/05/15
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Re: Cartesianism and Violence [Re: Kurt]
    #23945227 - 12/21/16 05:11 AM (7 years, 1 month ago)

Mind and Body
Thoughts and Feelings
Opinion and Observation
Subjective and Objective
Implicit and Explicit
Central and Peripheral(nervous system)



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OfflineBuster_Brown
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Re: Cartesianism and Violence [Re: sudly] * 1
    #23945274 - 12/21/16 06:20 AM (7 years, 1 month ago)

In the separation of Jungs 'daimon', or quintessence, from the husk, one can attribute Cartesianism to the former and empiricism to the latter.

If the daimon is entrapped by ideals then that may support  matt 5:27-8 in that a change in an ideal results in a change of empirical evidence.

i.e Rhizome's predilection to  steal his parents car is thwarted by the lack of the corresponding ideal in the object (his parents), whereas a conformity of ideals may result in imprisonment  for both parties and their "quintessences".

Isolation of Cartesian examples may then depend on the ideals of the "husks" conforming to non-judgementalism and letting inclement weather roll off a duck's back, so to speak.


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Re: Cartesianism and Violence [Re: Buster_Brown]
    #23945290 - 12/21/16 06:37 AM (7 years, 1 month ago)

What in the fuck are you talking about?


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Re: Cartesianism and Violence [Re: sudly]
    #23945311 - 12/21/16 07:03 AM (7 years, 1 month ago)

The fork in the road.


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Re: Cartesianism and Violence [Re: Buster_Brown]
    #23945319 - 12/21/16 07:13 AM (7 years, 1 month ago)

If that's the case then a choice has to be made and I choose the anatomy of the human nervous system explained through biology and modern evolutionary understandings.

Quote:

Is Cartesian Dualism, mind and body?




Yup.


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Re: Cartesianism and Violence [Re: sudly]
    #23945334 - 12/21/16 07:24 AM (7 years, 1 month ago)

The vigorous route with ever new obstacles to surmount.


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Re: Cartesianism and Violence [Re: Buster_Brown]
    #23945346 - 12/21/16 07:37 AM (7 years, 1 month ago)

But boy do those summits look beautiful back there, and at least I got some photos.


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Re: Cartesianism and Violence [Re: sudly]
    #23945353 - 12/21/16 07:45 AM (7 years, 1 month ago)

Care to compare skylines?



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Re: Cartesianism and Violence [Re: Buster_Brown]
    #23945362 - 12/21/16 07:52 AM (7 years, 1 month ago)



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Re: Cartesianism and Violence [Re: sudly]
    #23945381 - 12/21/16 08:12 AM (7 years, 1 month ago)

chaos vs order one might observe.
       
               


Edited by Buster_Brown (12/21/16 08:19 AM)


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Re: Cartesianism and Violence [Re: Buster_Brown]
    #23945412 - 12/21/16 08:28 AM (7 years, 1 month ago)

Negative entropy is a thing by Schrodinger and it's what I believe instead of karma.

Quote:

The concept and phrase "negative entropy" was introduced by Erwin Schrödinger in his 1944 popular-science book What is Life? Later, Léon Brillouin shortened the phrase to negentropy,to express it in a more "positive" way: a living system imports negentropy and stores it.

Indeed, negentropy has been used by biologists as the basis for purpose or direction in life, namely cooperative or moral instincts
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negentropy#cite_note-6




In my view morality isn't objective because it's subjective and not instinctive because a sense of morality requires conscious reasoning of good and bad.

Quote:

Instinctive: relating to or prompted by instinct; done without conscious thought.




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Re: Cartesianism and Violence [Re: sudly]
    #23945440 - 12/21/16 08:41 AM (7 years, 1 month ago)

I appreciate your divisive co-operation.


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Re: Cartesianism and Violence [Re: Buster_Brown]
    #23945447 - 12/21/16 08:45 AM (7 years, 1 month ago)

Truth ain't no democracy.


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Re: Cartesianism and Violence [Re: sudly]
    #23945618 - 12/21/16 09:54 AM (7 years, 1 month ago)

Isn't it? the refutation of Cartesianism on the principle of physical involvement with nature and its entities is to place us in Kurt's lap.


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Re: Cartesianism and Violence [Re: Buster_Brown] * 1
    #23946501 - 12/21/16 04:05 PM (7 years, 1 month ago)

Psychology has never been an exact science, but I won't assume that is so by nature. The brain is so complex and difficult to study that progress in that regard is very slow, perhaps all but non-existent to date. Does this mean the question of meaning cannot be approached using the scientific method? I think it's a bit pre-mature to suggest an answer one way or the other.

In the mean time, humans have been doing the best they can dealing with pre and post modern problems without the benefit of science. If Cartesianism does promote violence it's only because it has been wildly successful on the non-phychological front and inherently changed the way we interact in the world. But humans are adaptable creatures. Some people thrive despite the general removal of ourselves from more natural surroundings. Is this a good or bad thing? Who is to say?


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"You’re not looking close enough if you can only see yourself in people who look like you." —Ayishat Akanbi


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Re: Cartesianism and Violence [Re: Rahz]
    #23946563 - 12/21/16 04:27 PM (7 years, 1 month ago)

The problem with psychology is essentially this. Physics, chemistry, biology etc. can be reduced down to one or two factors at a time, so that each can be observed and understood in isolation.

Psychology almost never can do this because it's dealing with people's brains and minds, which have hundreds of factors and maybe even thousands when it all comes down it.

When it can, psychology can make contributions to the human understanding of the world as great as any other science. Read about the Law of Effect if you're skeptical - grokking the Law of Effect will change your entire life.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_effect


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