What is it, itself that we call the paradigm? Does it make sense to ask? What is it that we call the neuemenal structure of reality?
A better question: An empiricist's first philosophical principle seems to be in that observations that are repeatable are generally of value. Why?
A repeatable trial doesn't necessarily suggest the meaning of cause and effect "itself". It articulates something just as however it is in itself, as opposed to being imparted with human conceptions, which is something else. In other words, empiricality in this sense, is the principle basis of generic objectification.
The general meaning of nature that may be particularly sought in causality, seems to be implied. But in principle, empiricality only describes the generality which we find of things in observation, and "in themselves" this generic way. The particular thing in itself, then, is something we seem to relate to on another basis, or based on other principles not named here. We just think to remain consistent with this reality.
For example, we do not "sense" causality, in particular. This may be held as the basis of scientific/empirical principle, as counterintuitive as it may seem. That is, in a statement; we do not have one of five senses, any faculty of sense that relates directly with causes.
"When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connexion; any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only find, that the one does actually, in act, follow the other. The impulse of one billiard-ball is attended with motion in the second. This is the whole that appears to the outward senses. The mind feels no sentiment or inward impression from this succession of objects: consequently, there is not, in any single, particular instance of cause and effect, any thing which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connexion."
David Hume; Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
David Hume's way of reconciling things is interesting. He says we relate to nature, and things in themselves, but our intuitive ideal of causality, of particular nature which we may generally incline to, must be deprived of necessity. No doubt this is a strange thing to say, but isn't this the way things are?
It is only in the decided lack of intimate causal understanding of nature, that turns us and inclines us and sets us upon the principles of working with "experience" or "experiment" (empeirikos, "in trial"). At the very least this is an important principle, which the sciences appeal to.
"..We fancy, that were we brought on a sudden into this world, we could at first have inferred that one billiard ball would communicate motion to another upon impulse, and that we needed not to have waited for the event, in order to pronounce with certainty concerning it. Such is the influence of custom, that, where it is strongest, it not only covers our natural ignorance but even conceals itself, and seems not to take place, merely because it is found in the highest degree."
First principles of nature seem be of causality, going back all the way to Aristotle's proto-empirical materialism, (or perhaps some insight of Democritus's or Epicurus's, in materiality as atomism, an ontically reductive nature). But first principles of empirical practice, and that is to say modern science, seem not to be reducible to causality - or at least as Hume says, not to "necessarily" determined causes.
I would consider myself a non-reductive empiricist, so far as I am no determinist, or machinist, and recognizing this lends me to understand nature as it is in itself, without false, or customary concepts placed upon it. I wouldn't consider myself an empiricist in exclusion of other things, or in absolutely rejecting a reality beyond my organic experience, but I find I come by nature in principle, as beginning with my own.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empiricism
So here is a question: Would you consider yourself an empiricist, and in what principle would you say so?
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I sympathize with that view DQ. Maybe I can partly respond to that, in a general way.
I might say I am not a materialist.
φύσις to me is a philosophical conception in part, meaning nature. It is fit to wonder what is meant by "nature" as we use the term. If physicalism means a position that physicality "is what is", there is at least formally speaking, a tautology in this. It would be like claiming it is either raining or not raining outside. And indeed not to be confused with that, if physis is what is, as opposed to what is not, there is another problem of consistency with that, (in what "nothing", or "non-being" is). It may be argued that physicality may just appeal to what is "real", which is common to think, but that would be a concept (effective as it is) not derived at all from nature itself, but the falsification of human imputations of concepts or meaning, - objectivity - which is not nature itself but in generic notion. (excluding human imputation of meaning, can suggest nature or the "thing in itself" in one sense, but not that such a thing, is found from itself, just as a falsification of humanism.) In short, such questions of nature, to me seem open, and come in piecemeal, where we are doing the best we can.
Strict arguments aside, I think it is not often appreciated that philosophical principles which initially pose material existence, are at least somewhat historically removed from the modern empiricist's methodology base relationship to nature, which tends to express physis reductively, as consensus based realism. I think this is a mistake. So I would bracket the question of an empiricist's "physicalism", to be considered by tendency as a more generic relation, to the more notional thing in itself. For instance, nature can be considered in general, as a consensus basis, a basis of objectivity, and that is fine. But objectivity is not to my mind the nature of reality.
I guess the matter of argument, for the philosophically inclined would be partly in being actually clear in whether, and when one begins with empirical principle specifically, the principle of working from sense experience, and how that meets nature. Speaking for myself, I tend to identify with philosophy here, but I think people simplify that.
I don't think the material atomism of Democritus is wrong, (I don't think it is "right" either). Or at least I can say, I don't think Aristotle's method of material analysis, his conception of matter and the form it takes, is wrong, so much as it seems like these ideas of nature, are posed in a much different way than we are accustomed, for instance, in empirical sense basis, which has tended to be able to imply things in themselves generically. I think Aristote's hylomorphism is sometimes what people speak of as physicalism today, although, in that there may be some discrepancy in how modern science appeals to empiricality in these uses.
But in any case to me, beginning with the senses, conjecturing on nature, would not to me equate to materialism. Take Hume's billiard ball analogy. Hume, as I read him, is not saying the universe itself is a 2 dimensional green felt, and the relation of parts, upon it, even as this may seem intuitive to us, even if there is a correspondence. He is saying that our methodology, and our tendency to understand nature seems to generally come to something like that in a generic way.
Empiricism seems to have to do with our objectivity, and our scientific paradigms, in short, and materialism or physicalism tends to be implied in them. So if you are looking for tiers, I think I would agree, it is possible in a way to lay them out. First it means being open to novel phenomenological occurences (as husserl says "to the thing itself"), and then it means generally recognizing this possible difference from generic, consensus based conceptions. As important and effective as that consensus basis is, clearly observation and consistency in approach to things, does not necessarily mean the particular notion of conjecture we look to as science. And arguably at least, science, does not reduce to that.
I guess I could put it to a philosophy of science. It seems to me commonplace to take for granted the way things like empiricism, science, nature, physics, and matter, relate as a whole. They can be taken piecemeal. I think Hume's empiricism is clearly aware of the problems of custom, especially in the most distinguished instances...
"Such is the influence of custom, that, where it is strongest, it not only covers our natural ignorance but even conceals itself, and seems not to take place, merely because it is found in the highest degree."
So I'd say to such reservations, I think it is important to recognize an organic and natural notion of beginning with the senses, and one's own experience. I guess that this can sometimes be forgotten as an empiricist philosophy develops and typically attempts to impress its principles, as the basis of consensus reality.
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