Just out of curiosity, and please ignore this thread if you do not acknowledge the plausibility of this theory or have no relevant experience, but did anyone ever experience anything under any psychedelic that could possibly support the idea that we are living in a virtual world/simulation?
if would be interesting to read your stories and I believe they'd also be interesting to anyone else who acknowledges such a theory.
thanks!
-------------------- For years on end I have been sitting here, impatiently awaiting potency: some explosive revelatory surge that will carry me away and permit no looking back. But this moment of deliverance has not arrived, and I have done nothing to hasten it. Perhaps it doesn’t matter. Perhaps I wasn’t meant to do anything. In which case, I have succeeded admirably.
|
I've kinda abandoned the simulation theory the more I've done psychedelics. Technically it's more likely this is a simulation than not one. I'm not sure if it actually matters though.
From using psychedelics it seems to me reality is some sort of infinite imagination. Ask yourself what you can't imagine? If you can imagine it then as technology progresses won't it be possible to make almost anything? I think parallel universes and the many-worlds to be more likely than simulation but it doesn't mean they both can't be true. I've watched reality be deconstructed and remade while under high doses. As if you were traveling "worlds" Also it could all be in my head hahahah
If you like philosophy I highly recommended the talos principle. It's 66% off now and talks about sim theory endless a little like portal 2 in game play.
Quote:
A nonexistent object is something that does not exist. Some examples often cited are: Zeus, Pegasus, Sherlock Holmes, Vulcan, the perpetual motion machine, the golden mountain, the fountain of youth, the round square, etc. Some important philosophers have thought that the very concept of a nonexistent object is contradictory (Hume) or logically ill-formed (Kant, Frege), while others (Leibniz, Meinong, the Russell of Principles of Mathematics) have embraced it wholeheartedly.
One of the reasons why there are doubts about the concept of a nonexistent object is this: to be able to say truly of an object that it doesn't exist, it seems that one has to presuppose that it exists, for doesn't a thing have to exist if we are to make a true claim about it? In the face of this puzzling situation, one has to be very careful when accepting or formulating the idea that there are nonexistent objects. It turns out that Kant's view that “exists” is not a “real” predicate and Frege's view, that “exists” is not a predicate of individuals (i.e., a predicate that yields a well-formed sentence if one puts a singular term in front of it), has to be abandoned if one is to accept the claim that there are nonexistent objects.
This entry is an examination of the many questions which arise in connection with the view that there are nonexistent objects. The following are particularly salient: What reasons are there (if any) for thinking that there are nonexistent objects? If there are nonexistent objects, then what kind of objects are they? How can they be characterized? Is it possible to provide a consistent theory of nonexistent objects? What is the explanatory force of a consistent theory of nonexistent objects (if such a thing is possible)?
Quote:
The structure of the problem of discourse about the past and the future is very similar to the structure of the problem of fictional discourse. Consider the following sentences:
(1) Socrates was a philosopher.
(2) The first female pope will be black.
Given that the sentences (1) and (2) have the logical structure of predications, i.e., the structure “Fb”, and given that (PP) is valid, (1) implies that Socrates exists and (2) implies that the first female pope exists.
Indeed, the sentences (1) and (2) look like predications. Grammatically speaking, they consist of a subject term (“Socrates”, “the first female pope”) and a predicate term (“was a philosopher”, “will be black”.) But while it is certainly true now (in the third millennium C.E.) that Socrates was a philosopher, it is also certainly true now that Socrates does not exist anymore.
Second, let's assume, for the sake of argument, that indeed there will be a female pope (and exactly one first female pope) at some time in the far future and that she will be black and that she has not even been fathered yet. Given these assumptions, it is certainly true now that the first female pope does not yet exist.
Again, there are several attempts to resolve this problem. One possible strategy is to deny that sentences like (1) and (2) really have the logical structure of predications. One might suggest the following alternative interpretations, using “P” (read: “It has been the case”) and “F” (read: “It will be the case”) as “tense operators”:
(1′) P(Socrates is a philosopher).
(2′) F(The first female pope is black).
Note that the tense operators “P” and “F” are sentence operators, like the story operator from above. Just as the story operator blocks the inference to existence claims about fictitious objects, the tense operators block the inference from (1′) to
(3) Socrates exists.
and from (2′) to
(4) The first female pope exists. (For a tense operator strategy see Prior 1968.)
There is a lot to be said in favor of this logical interpretation of tenses. Yet, it leaves some problems unresolved. One of them is the problem of tensed plural quantifiers. Consider, for instance:
(5) There have been two kings named Charles.
The standard tense operator interpretation of (5) yields:
(5′) P(There are two kings named Charles).
However, while (5) is true, (5′) is false, since at no time in the past there have been two kings named Charles simultaneously. (See Lewis 2004.) Thus, the standard tense operator strategy seems to fail in cases like this one.
Another problem that the tense operator strategy leaves unresolved is the problem of relations between present and non-present objects. Given the principle that a real (two-place) relation can obtain only if both terms of the relation exist, and given that past and future objects do not (now) exist, relations between present and past or future objects are impossible. Yet it seems that there are plenty of relations between present and past (or future) objects. For instance, I stand in the relation of being one of six granddaughters of to my grandmother. Likewise, perhaps I stand in the relation of being the grandmother of to a future child.
Here is a Meinongian solution: Suppose objects pop in and out of existence but thereby do not gain or loose their being. (For a Meinongian, all existent objects have being but not all being objects exist.) According to this picture, “Socrates” now denotes the nonexistent Socrates and “the first female pope” now denotes the nonexistent first female pope. Accordingly, although we cannot allow for the inference from
(1) Socrates was a philosopher.
and
(2) The first female pope will be black.
to
(3) Socrates exists.
and
(4) The first female pope exists.
we can allow for the inference from (1) and (2) to
(3′) There is something that is identical with Socrates.
and
(4′) There is something that is identical with the first female pope.[12]
This result does justice to two otherwise incompatible intuitions, namely (i) the intuition that neither Socrates nor the first female pope exist right now, and (ii) the intuition that it is nevertheless possible to refer to Socrates and to the first female pope (or, to put it another way: the intuition that the name “Socrates” and the description “the first female pope” are not empty).
Tensed plural quantifiers do not pose a problem for a Meinongian. Tensed quantifiers in general may be interpreted as restricted quantifiers that range over a particular subdomain of nonexistent objects: “there was” may be interpreted as a quantifier that ranges over the subdomain of past objects (i.e., objects that have existed but do not exist anymore); analogously, “there will be” may be interpreted as a quantifier that ranges over the subdomain of future objects (i.e., objects that will exist but do not exist yet).[13]
Furthermore, from a Meinongian point of view, relations between existent and nonexistent objects are ubiquitous. Remember the Meinongian solution to the problem of intentionality: People fear, admire, dream of, hope for or imagine nonexistent objects. Thus, relations between present and non-present objects do not pose a particular problem for a Meinongian.
-------------------- It's all for the s
|