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Quasar Praiser Registered: 01/05/15 Posts: 11,002 |
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I've heard random noises and thought it was words before. It's just like when we talk to people, sometimes we don't clearly understand a word they say and think they have said something else.
Other sounds like door slams, wind whirls, animal sounds, bushes etc can sometimes sound like words too. A 'bodiless voice' is just a misinterpreted sound. Humans don't have perfect hearing, especially as we get older.
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Quasar Praiser Registered: 01/05/15 Posts: 11,002 |
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I wouldn't call it an auditory hallucination or audilization, instead a simple auditory misinterpretation.
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conduit Registered: 09/17/08 Posts: 2,721 Last seen: 7 years, 1 month |
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Some of the analytical people I mentioned previously had complete stories told to them. In the case of Carl Jung he may have been schizophrenic I read a little deeper on his life and accounts.
-------------------- The geometry of us is no chance. We are antennae, we are tuning forks, we are receiver and transmitters of all energy. We are more than we know. - @entheolove "I found I could say things with color and shapes that I couldn't say any other way - things I had no words for" - Georgia O'Keefe I think the word is vagina
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Quasar Praiser Registered: 01/05/15 Posts: 11,002 |
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What kind of stories did they have told to them? Weren't they the ones telling the stories?
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Thinker, blinker, writer, typer. Registered: 11/26/14 Posts: 1,688 |
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Quote: Hey Nuentoter I wanted to take a shot at this. The idea of "inner" voices somehow escaping from the confines of "influential" thinkers is interesting to consider. I remember reading that Newton was both incredibly repressed (never had sex in his life), and had some far out alchemical ideas at the same time. As an aside, he was a historical genius. Quote: The etymology of analysis as "unloosening" is crucial, I think. But that is difficult to see, too, because we follow the modern concept which is a consolidation of that analyses. The modern idea of an analysis has actually in that changed to be defined as what is "contained" somehow to the intellect. Between that notion of contained intelligibility, and "intelligibility ex nihilio, the voice coming out of nowhere, what a handful! What a contrast, and tension! But it is too tempting to not try to get at. Should we think of ideas as ideally contained, or as coming out of nowhere? Where is our excluded middle? Where is the unspoken eruption of an analytically defined world? To "modern" analysis, I'll note the same thing I have been up to this point. As Hume and Kant have expressed, ideas are variously constrained. Analysis is a consistency or domain of truth in virtue of being an implicitly projected statement (a logos) that while projected, does not appeal to anything beyond its conceptual content. It's projectional value is entirely assumed to be in that. For instance the statement "All bachelor's are unmarried" is analytical, because the meaning or "truth value" of the statement is found in analysis of the concept (bachelors). It is contained. On the other hand, of course it is questionable pragmatic value to have this knowledge of bachelors in mind, if it was indeed contained in the concept. This is maybe an analogy of how we think of an intellect, in a certain paradox. Of This is not the limited scope of possible value found in logic or intellect of course, but it demonstrates the idea - and problem - of containment. In the empiricist Hume's case, all ideas are either analyses or ideally contained ideas, or "matters of fact", and anything aside from this double pronged approach is senseless and should not be expressed. Actually... to be specific, he said they are ideations that should be "committed to the flames". It would be worth quoting: Quote: This has been called Hume's Fork, because it is two pronged (or three pronged depending on how seriously you take the project of marginalizing ideas) My suggestion is not to save anybody "the trouble" of burning books in their own libraries. I would only ask how an idea being "contained" can become an idea we project on to the world, as of value? Yes, analytic philosophers have indeed made a bit more of analysis than the idea of bachelors being married, but it is questionable each step of the way. Today, we dwell in projected analyses - that is where our heads are. We can simply note it. Yet we can inquire at each step, how does an analytic proposition have value, how does analytic mindedness have value, and how does analysis of the world ostensibly have value? Quote: Anyway, to your question: I think you are not asking for a poet's imagination, any more than you are asking for an empiricist to describe how ideas are contained... I would note that two of the names you mentioned are such quintessential "philosophers". That is, they are the kind of rationalist philosophers which stand for something aside from what Hume has spoken of in his two pronged approach. Socrates and Descartes are even exemplary of the voice out of nowhere. While noting the obliqueness and eccentricity of a term which means "love of wisdom", or "beyond or after" physis at the same time I would say these iterations can be acknowledged as distinct. I don't quite think these works should be burned, and would say this is maybe even very wrong headed, but I do think we can question the ideal notion of the intelligibility of the world, which seems to come out of nothing. I would say my approach is the Nietzschean. I believe one does not step from form into "reality", but to formlessness, and irrationality. Or to maybe take a less insane sounding approach, Nagarjuna's "Form is emptiness, emptiness is form". As for these "rationalists", what I can see is that both men valued the ideal of truth being represented in a certain way. As philosophers "par excellence" they valued "ideas". The Platonic "forms" in Socrates', and in Descartes' the case of the "thinking thing" (I think therefore I am) are incomprehensibly influential. These philosophers seem to appeal to the ideal "intelligibility" of things in the universe (an intelligible world rather than one "with accidents") or at least something that could be approached as dialectical intelligibility. That is something that I think is often suggested as the more reasonable mouthpiece of rational philosophers in an elusive way. In Socrates' case dialectics are the dogma itself, and in Descartes case, the value of dialectics are given over to something else, the embedded technical thinking of Hume, Kant, and the rest of modernity that considers the opposition a technical matter (there are acceptable kinds of ideas, and facts.) I would define dialectics as something that itself quite unaccountably has to do with both conversation and how it spontaneously, and rather unaccountably is said to move towards truth. I would argue that in situating the "unreasonable" disembodied voices coming from the universe in these Dialectics - in this fundamental faith in oppositions and syntheses all ages believe in, as reason, this is something just as unaccountable as what these thinkers appropriate as voice existing out of itself, or out of ostensibly nothing. If anyone would say we do not value representation of a "voice" in such an obscure way, I would say look and consider how in any historically "enlightened" epochs in the West (Say specifically ancient Greek and modern enlightenments), the singularly "rational" basis of discourse, always relies on a philosophical pursuit or science coming to bear, but hand in hand with democratic or political movement. Why is this? Is it just a coincidence enlightenment is both about political representation and the general representation of truth? Hardly, I would say! These overlapping conditions both suggest the meaning of representation at the same time, and have never been close to disentangled, and that is rarely what anyone has thought to do. What does truth have to do with "representation"? Is it egalitarian, or is egalitarianism anything which considers merit of a representable notion held? What does representation of "what is true", have to do with "what is"? Is that a necessary social construct? Where is the philosopher King? Was he or she not that buzzing philosophical gadfly displaced and swatted, due to an ostensible opposition to the polis of dialogue? Yet then again, was that not the ideal forum for kingly philosophical gadflies? What is a voice of reason, or rationality, and in what virtue is it really expressed? If we cannot say for certain aside from platitudes, I wonder if we can say we understand where this voice really comes from. In any case, I'd say it makes a lot of sense, if only in terms of allegories to their doctrines, that these two quintessential philosophical dialecticion or rationalists have "heard voices". And while I would say there is something very naive about rationalism, at least as far as my human ears have heard it, at the same time I don't think that the implications of rationalist doctrines are just gotten out of, as easily as some simple turn of dialogue, towards "objectification", or the idea of setting up some way to just isolate ideas to their appropriate vestiges as the empiricist says would be appropriate. In one way it makes perfect sense to hypothetically think of a psychological explanation for the minds behind these projected formalistic worlds. Of course.... In another way, namely to the extent that we rely and dwell in these worlds of forms, such silliness, it is extremely unsatisfactory. The philosopher Nietzsche (whose words I previously borrowed) said that the fundamental faith of philosophical reflection is in the belief of opposite values. I believe it is in the convenient oppositional dialectic between rationalists (or "idealists") and empiricists, that we find faith in today, and namely it is embedded in the ideas we tend to consider as reasonable closure or cleavage between ideal realms of idea, and of fact. For instance, it is very reasonable to imagine that physical reality is a determinable phenomenon, by the idea of mathematical calculation, and a formal structure. I think that is a socio-cultural to some extent. Undoubtedly it is reality too - we live in an engineer driven, brave new world. Call it a cultural fact. My first hint that this modern notion was wrong, was that upon consideration, analytic mindedness could not be consistently or ideally projected as the world as a "state of affairs" or situation. Then I found the concept of analysis itself, in context, was not intended as a consolidation, but was situated as unloosening, or dispersion of some concatenation in its original context, and generally it was an entirely different involvement (not with language obviously, but material analysis), than what we consider it to be today. Aristotle used analysis to arrive in a much different way at hypokeimenon the subject of knowledge, and this has been first confused and convoluted, and then forgotten. I would like to be able to explain this more in passing but this is already a digression. In short, hypokeimenon, the subject of knowledge as an essential or substantive underlying "thing", is being simultaneously appealed to (as material truth) and displaced by an idea arrived at in a different but emulated way, as "what is contained in a subject", analysis itself. This is what is appropriate to our theoretical and linguistic "meaning" bound universe, so far as we are assuming it in that, anyhow. We dwell in a world of theories which are projected ad infinitum, indeed progressively outward into the great unknown or the minute, but also in ad infinitum regress at the same time, when we wonder how to ground any notion. This is a "crisis" (as Husserl put it) that anyone in a postmodern world is touchy about. Pragmatism is something that helps in these considerations, and yet we may look at our values starkly. This theoretical world is more or less practical, and yet do we imagine we live in a world that has overturned the idea of theoretical, or intelligible realms? Do we imagine we have turned back the metaphysicians inversions? It was thought to be in such an anti-metaphysic gesture, that the puritan Wittgenstein said, "the world consists in facts...not things.". But to return to the question, before I lose it... if my response would have to be whether or not the great "idea" should be escaping these containments of modern analysis, I would not know what to say. Would it be better to say ideas come of the wind's piping of the hollows of the earth? Maybe. Maybe taking a few steps back would be helpful. But I think what I believe, is in the Nietzschean turn, to recognize the critique of rationalism is not in the usual turn to empiricism, but irrationality. I have no solution in the usual oppositions other than to say that the question could be largely considered context, in which the ideas of voices were spoken of, and considered that way, where they most approximately came from. I guess am suggesting that these rationalists, heralds of intelligibility and sense of the universe, can be considered on their own terms. That is what in such an overwinded way, I have intended to comment on. I think we can see how different ideas of a rational or sensible world are, just between Socrates and Descartes. There influence is difficult to doubt because that is what they each taught. In Socrates' case, the inner voice or "daemon", was not evil, in the sense we may think of demons. Specifically, as the wikipedia page quotes, it was a voice that "warned him of things, but did not tell him what to do exactly." He told of this in the Apologia. Another context to consider (aside from imagining a situation) is that this story is told by Socrates due to the pressure of the polis of Athens, to account for himself, in his trial. That pressure is important to consider I think. We could also note that Socrates' oft repeated notion "I know at least that I do not know", is another hesitant, skeptical iteration - and yet one which is actually derived by appeal to authority of the divine oracle of Delphi! The gnomic pronouncement was made by the Oracle, and Socrates ever ironic, went about searching for someone who would falsify this. So these two hesitant, even skeptical iterations, it would seem, have questionable bases in Socrates. Though we may doubt "in principle" most of all today what principle? It is interesting to think about where such inquisitiveness and puzzlement would be situated, beyond myth and voices from nothing. I think Socrates is begging the question. Surely one principle of doubt we appeal to is Descartes. In Descartes, it will always be observed that there is a fundamental turn and inversion in nearly every conception. In the case of daemons the A daemon is now said to be evil. Through the Evil Demon, in a much different way, Descartes himself (like Socrates) was "oppressed" by the idea that anything could be doubted. He was able to doubt traditional substantive "subject" of knowledge, all his academic learning from mathematics to physics, and through that evil demon, he extrapolated another point of reference, the subject we are. He fundamentally changed everything, in that, and this is "why" a new idea of a subject was thought of as something circumscribed in analyticity (or technical conceptuality) rather than something accessible. This is how Descartes, somewhat accountably, and yet questionably sought a "foundational certainty for the basis of science". He doubted everything until he came to "what could not be doubted" - that he was thinking. Of course today we do not tend to think a thinking thing exists, but we do take the notion of solipsistic eccentricity, as the value of reasoning. How do we respond to Descartes' voice? I think there is only one way to. Just as we may doubt the allegory of a demon's voice, and accept the conclusion in one sense, when we come to it, we doubt the conclusion (the existence of the thinking thing as "analogy") and turn to accept the eccentric path towards what cannot be called anything but solipsistic doubt. It seems like modern people accept the questionable, questioning intonation of this evil demon, as a voice coming from nowhere. The " thinking thing". Maybe Look closely to Descartes' Discourse on Method? In any case this was my effort to consider the question of these questionable voices. Thanks for reading, looking forward to the continued dialogue and critique, my good friends! Edited by Kurt (07/13/15 03:55 AM)
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Stranger Registered: 07/14/15 Posts: 20 Last seen: 2 years, 6 months |
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Consciousness is like Schrodinger cat, it exists yet it doesn't. We had 1 in infinite chances that we have consciousness and against all odds we do.
All that matters is that we have consciousness and that we are aware of it. Some are more aware than others. Its hard to explain how we arrived at such a conclusion after countless hours and sessions of contemplation. As long as you don't throw out something bat-shit crazy like penguins have no vertebrae i think youre okay. all that is need is patience and understanding. Don't immediately disregard something someones says just because you dont believe it, maybe they are more consciousness aware than you are and if you actually give them the time of day instead of condemning they you may actually see things from their point of view. Humans used to think the earth was flat, we now know that is not true. There is no right or wrong answer, only that which seems logical at the time. Maybe you don't have all the evidence to make a logical conclusion that someone already has. If i start speaking another language and you had no idea that other languages existed you would simply think I am being illogical and need to speak in our native tongue. It may not be that someone is unable to explain how they came to the conclusion, it may be that you have condemned them and they now feel too ashamed to even further their ideas. Many dreams are killed this way. But in this same way legends are born when all things that seem logical are not taken for granted.
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Thinker, blinker, writer, typer. Registered: 11/26/14 Posts: 1,688 |
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Schrodinger's cat (?)
I generally agree that consciousness seems somehow be this minute or improbable thing. Somehow, it seems to be the kernal of things, and yet (to my mind) that is not any face value "mental-physical" aggregation, like some tunnel through dimensions of a pituitary gland, or a ghost in the machine, (etc) but mainly something constructed by relative discussion. That would probably not be a huge leap. To say this minute hidden "kernal" is found in the prospect of epistemic discussion in general is basically the same. For instance there are more logically based examples that seem to offer closure. To take a typical example, are we obliged always to talk about our experience of "the color red" (or any such quale) to talk about a whole impression of the world, or experience through consciousness, on a rational basis? It seems to me that neither logic nor consciousness are "facts", or domains of facts even, but they still seem to be something like epistemelogical ground zeroes. I think Kant's transcendental subject is the best we have from this side of the world to work with, and then there is "open" conjecture which levels to some form of common sense. Appealing to logic or particular standing facts at every turn may not be paying much attention to consciousness, or even a very intimate correspondence with physical world (maybe to say the same thing). But then, in a positive way, paying attention to consciousness, either is not paying much attention to a world logic and facts, or perhaps going through very many routines of epistemelogical discussion which can miss the physical world that way. It seems to be a traditional western thing. Oh you found that speck of red! Now what were you saying about your experience of the color red in the world? :-) Edited by Kurt (07/17/15 03:29 PM)
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