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ballsalsa
Universally Loathed and Reviled



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Re: "I know because I know!" [Re: wangel]
#21922576 - 07/09/15 11:26 PM (8 years, 6 months ago) |
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Quote:
wangel said: No, I don't get it. Look up Burden of Proof and The Null Hypothesis.
what about this?
Johnny:I can accurately predict the outcome of U.S. Presidential Elections Jimmy:no you can't
There is really no way for johnny to prove his claim. Even if he accurately predicted 10 elections in a row, its such a small sample, that it could just be dumb luck. and yet, if johnny did predict 10 elections in a row, how could jimmy possibly claim to disprove his statement? it could even be a true statement, just without a a method to prove or disprove it
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Edited by ballsalsa (07/09/15 11:27 PM)
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Asante
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-------------------- Omnicyclion.org higher knowledge starts here
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nuentoter
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Re: "I know because I know!" [Re: Asante]
#21925808 - 07/10/15 07:21 PM (8 years, 6 months ago) |
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Well i guess i never really answered the OP. I believe that someone can claim they know through experience that has nothing to do with scientific backup. For them to be not full of shit is another thing, but if someone experiences something first hand, they are not mentally or chemically skewed, and are being as objective as possible about the experience then they can claim they know something because they do. Now the person making such a claim must also realize that their experience probably wont be the epitome of knowledge on the subject. Also to say they know it because they know it in my scenario would be incorrect wording, they should state "i know because i was there" or "i know because i experienced it" or something along those lines. To state that you know simply because you do infers that you had existing knowledge about something with no external experience. This I call bullshit on, at best they know because of deduction, induction, or guessing.
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The geometry of us is no chance. We are antennae, we are tuning forks, we are receiver and transmitters of all energy. We are more than we know. - @entheolove "I found I could say things with color and shapes that I couldn't say any other way - things I had no words for" - Georgia O'Keefe I think the word is vagina
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sudly
Darwin's stagger


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Re: "I know because I know!" [Re: nuentoter]
#21925856 - 07/10/15 07:41 PM (8 years, 6 months ago) |
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I'm curious to find out what the difference between someone experiencing something religious is and someone experiencing something like an alien abduction.
-------------------- I am whatever Darwin needs me to be.
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DividedQuantum
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Re: "I know because I know!" [Re: nuentoter]
#21925860 - 07/10/15 07:41 PM (8 years, 6 months ago) |
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I don't necessarily disagree with the spirit of your post, but on the other hand, I feel I have to point out that the argument against it would be that first-person, subjective accounts of something that happens to said person are more often than not totally unreliable. It's very hard for anybody to objectively judge what is happening to them, and much more often than not one is wrong. I.e., what one thinks happened is often not what happened at all.
So that would be a very legitimate rebuttal to your post.
-------------------- Vi Veri Universum Vivus Vici
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OrgoneConclusion
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Re: "I know because I know!" [Re: nuentoter]
#21925885 - 07/10/15 07:50 PM (8 years, 6 months ago) |
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Are you aware that all 20,000 viewers of the Fatima viewers who claimed they saw the sun move were in error?
Are you aware that all 50,000 viewers of the Phoenix Lights who claimed they saw an alien craft were in error?
Are you aware that all 250,000 viewers of the polarized bank window in Florida claimed they saw the Virgin Mary were in error?
Almost all people are unable to distance their expectation/bias from an event and thus commingle their observation with their conclusion as if they were the same thing.
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OrgoneConclusion
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I see you got there ahead of me.
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DividedQuantum
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I was just warming up the crowd for your arrival.
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Kurt
Thinker, blinker, writer, typer.

Registered: 11/26/14
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How about some phenomenological primer?
Quote:
“Husserl goes beyond the world given to the natural attitude and he goes beyond psychology, but he also goes beyond what we could call the “apophatic” domain the realm of meaning and propositions, which Frege calls the realm of sense (sinn). In doing so. Hussars moves beyond logic as an apophatic science, which studies the structures of this domain…He distinguishes the apophatic domain and its formal logic from the transcendental subject and its transcendental logic… His science presupposes and examines the kind of truth we achieve in our experience of things, in the truth of correctness, and in the questions raised by formal logic. I believe it is important to distinguish phenomenology from the kind of science that reflects simply on the apophatic domain. We have access to the apophatic realm through what I would call propositional reflection, which is radically different from transcendental, philosophical reflection. The philosophical examination of truth is different from the logical analysis of meaning.”
Divided Quantum; the position I saw in Nuentoter's post seems reasonable to me. It is generally suggestive of acknowledging the practical beginning point where all post-cartesian thinkers "lovingly" begin.
To any contrary suggestion, the question you would eventually have to come up to is this: Where else are you going to find sensory experience, but in a subjective faculty, which bears the world as phenomenological intuition? Where better than in open contingency of an independent minded, practical correspondence with the world?
It doesn't seem to me that nuentoter was saying the possibility of these intuitions is in any way a certain, and yet that could generally provide a thoroughgoing, general basis, for what could be considered a practical empirical correspondence with the world. Empeiros, as what is found "in trial", would be possible to find in the risk of intuition. On the other hand, in principle it is not possible to find empirical research as anything fundamentally "certain" or instituted in the world even if that would seem to be a convenience to empiricists.
I am not sure where nuentoter stands, but I'd say a position of phenomenological intuitionalism seems reasonable to hold as possible contingence of argument, spoken of in one way, which for instance, compared to the OP, is at least not vested in any illusion of a simulacrum of arguments managing everything that is empirical. To put the possibility of phenomenology in certain terms, would perhaps be to admit as Kant did, of the necessity of a priori intuition.
This could be one way to suggest that the general contingency of arguments, must be found utterly in context, as opposed as something to generally theorize about. Often enough, the general idea of empiricism as ideal analysis of arguments gets removed from any trial basis in the idea of analysis. For instance, someone talking about data already gathered in textbooks, or generally the way understanding trails along empirical research, as empirical research, definitely begs the question. Is such an appeal to empiricism actually a trial basis?
It is possible to critique the dogma and institutionalism of the projected general circle of conjecture, or the "analysis of propositions" that is suggested as the meaning of empirical research so often. There is a neat essay by W.O. Quite on that here. A possible summary argument is that the dogma of analyticity is in how generally logical analysis which as an idea is projected outward in a certain sense as universal, or "objective" (ie. the logos) may be confused or convoluted with an empirical correspondence with the world.
Here is the classic argument: if you would deny cartesian subjective intuitions in general, you would probably be ascribing meaning to the "incident" or "situation", or "occurence" (etc) of a sensory experience, according to some surrounding structure. Is that idea of "sense" empirical necessarily? Perhaps it could be in a way. There would be utility in having this implied, shared frame of reference to senses, and yet how does that come about?
The general ideal anyway, is that from different points of view, relative aspects of a point of reference that we take for granted can be constructively gathered and determined. If a frame of reference is given in that way, it could even seem to include the "appropriate" meaning of phenomenological bearing in respect to the referent, as a general "gathering of data". This is suggested in the initial passage I quoted as the Fregean "sense" of propositions, or the sense we "make" ("propositional reflection").
This general theoretically implied frame of reference can't be grounded in epistemological terms though. That is what I have noticed. A proposition of a state of affairs, for instance, (Wittgenstein's attempt to ground the Fregean sense of propositions in a general way) is literally a backwards idea, insinuating "the way the world has to be, in order for propositions to be true". Aside from what it was intended to dictate as realism and an objectivity, it was itself a high Platonic idealism, and untenable in the terms which a state of affairs is useful for demanding. When this situation fell apart, the conclusion is that empiricism can't be asserted in any sense of logical "necessity".
It seems to me that usually this shared frame of reference, is something that is culturally leveled, for instance, by ethical value claims of "intellectual honesty" or scientific "integrity", which is fine, but it is not an epistemological proposition. I'd point out that those ideas only exist today, largely because there was a rigorous epistemological project that was attempted, and that failed to ground itself, and it is now appealed to in platitudes and insinuations, instead.
It is not only " intellectual" but a much larger and significant cultural and historical contingency. The implied, consolidated frame of reference was suggested specifically to void the uncertainties of phenomenological bearings ("pseudo problems") in the 20th century, namely when a continental and largely german phenomenologically based philosophical culture was perceived as threatening, for obviously non-philosophical reasons. An anglo american philosophical culture (in line with british empiricists) stood for radicalizing and consolidating its own "analytical" position, and in all that intellectual work, you can see gestures which are specifically contrived attempts to void or marginalize the "superficiality" of phenomenology, as an erroneous, troublesome, and patently useless element of subjectivity.
A rift remains both culturally and intellectually today, as the division between continental and analytic philosophy, or as said, between analysis of arguments and phenomenology.
The American pragmatists from another point of view came to be critical of its own analytic tradition. The essay Quine wrote was probably the first attack, in the 1950's. Richard Rorty writes about analyticity not from one side of the cultural rift or the other, but still with an insistent critique of analytic philosophy in mind:
Quote:
American philosophers were, for better or worse, bored with Dewey, and thus with pragmatism. They were sick of being told that pragmatism was the philosophy of American democracy, that Dewey was the great American intellectual figure of their century, and the like. They wanted something new, something they could get their philosophical teeth into. What showed up, thanks to Hitler and various other historical contingencies, was logical empiricism, an early version of what we now call ‘analytic philosophy’ ([2], p. 70).
Our "Anglo American" idea of empirical methodology is fundamentally guided by this idea of "analysis of propositions", for instance, specifically in Karl Popper's falisficationism. Theories stand in a contingency "to be falsified" (or as falsifiable), and much discussion is to expediently guide them to that contingency. It could be said even that the main suggestion of scientific research is ostensibly in distinguishing propositions from pseudo-propositions according to an implied frame of reference of what is sensible, more than considering truth or falsity. This leveling of propositions to being found with a "sense" (within the margins of implicit acceptible reference) is suggested for the purpose of supplying an implied assembly line economy of technical scientific research with its provisions for determining "actual" truth values, as a "technical" matter.
I think when you look to the conjecture of analysis in a context of discussion that goes beyond actual scientific practices, into epistemology, (which Quine suggests) it makes sense to look critically at these projected analyses of propositions as the face value appeals of "empirical" research. What does it essntially mean to actually find a correspondence with the world "in trial"? I don't know, but I can observe that theoretical or purely imagined discussions of propositions can seem to have little empirical utility in their own right.
What is projected or pointed to as "the logos", can be considered just as dogmatic as intuition, though it is projected in a different way. At least intuition is a risk, of possibly being either true or false, and could follow on that. Talking about the management of pseudo propositions and propositions; what is that? What sense is there in talking about propositions outside their actual contingency?
A friend of mine from Austria once told me it is interesting the way that as an american, I used the word science so generally, or namely with such a broad authority. After all aren’t there many different provisions and scopes of science to speak of, and not a singular logos, or methodology, each even grinding into the other like tectonic plates? I personally thought I was pretty aware of this, but I didn't realize it came down to a way of speaking, that I should stumble. The closest word my friend was using for "science" had much different implications. (I had questioned her "blunt" way of using the English word science to describe anything generally academic.) The word she was glossing was Wissenschaft. Later I found that French and German languages can aside from any institutional or doctrinal terms distinguish between knowledge that results from recognition (“connaitre” and “kennen”), and knowledge that results from understanding (savoir and wissen). English speakers don’t have ready linguistic equivalents for these distinctions, as a manner of speaking. We just have "knowledge" or the 19th century coinage sciencia.
So as for "science" then, maybe there are extraneous reasons it seems incomprehensible that phenomenologists like Kant or Husserl (and heck Descartes himself) could have suggested phenomenology as the driving basis of sciences?
Is it all one flat dimensionless "analysis" for us? What about pragmatism? I think the best that could be suggested in this thread is that. My proposition would be to move a description of empirical research away from this American institutionalism of thinking, and find the basis of our sciences in individuality, utility, and acceptance of some relative pluralism.
To be practically empirical could in a positive way possibly mean to assure that the projected analyticity of arguments, or demand for empirical arguement is met and considered in terms of some contingence of an actually proposed hypotheses. If you want to suggest empiricism, there is no abstraction. If one would suggest empirical research, make an argument, a progressive hypothesis, or allow other people to.
Can we in any way assure that an appeal to face value empiricism is actually found in empiricism? The idea of empiricism as a theoretical argument seems to be leveling the idea of empiricism either to what has already been gathered by better or more active minds than our own, or to what stands as what is "worse" than that. Is it unreasonable to say that an appeal to empirical proposition, actually be found in its terms as an empirical proposition, in other words, in its contingency? Where derives the intuition, and progressiveness of trial based philosophy? I'd say it is the very risk or "trial" that is taken, and it is that, which is truly empirical, and utterly contingent, and less theoretically simulated.
In terms of the projection of "analyticity" pragmatism is expressed as "a rejection of the idea that the function of thought is to describe, represent, or mirror reality." Instead, "pragmatists consider thought an instrument or tool for prediction, problem solving and action."
That would be a good general basis for knowledge I'd say. And knowledge could be more analytical or more phenomenological. Personally, I would suggest constructively to this discussion that we could at least look to way the logos is projected, in fair measure with something that goes beyond that limitation.
Maybe it's time to end this theoretical simulacrum of "analysis of empirical propositions"? Maybe it's time to allow empirical propositions to be made in a more open way, or less strictly enframed way.
Edited by Kurt (07/11/15 02:32 PM)
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pwnzer
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Re: "I know because I know!" [Re: Kurt]
#21927568 - 07/11/15 06:11 AM (8 years, 6 months ago) |
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falcon



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Re: "I know because I know!" [Re: pwnzer]
#21928903 - 07/11/15 01:34 PM (8 years, 6 months ago) |
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Your post seems to me to be a non sequitur, I don't see the relevance as a reply to Kurt's post. What were you conveying when you posted those links?
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DividedQuantum
Outer Head


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Re: "I know because I know!" [Re: Kurt]
#21929170 - 07/11/15 02:47 PM (8 years, 6 months ago) |
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Quote:
Kurt said: Divided Quantum; the position I saw in Nuentoter's post seems reasonable to me. It is generally suggestive of acknowledging the practical beginning point where all post-cartesian thinkers "lovingly" begin.
I sympathize with nuentoter's position as well, in some respects, and I said as much in my post. But the simple fact remains that what I said is true. The worst judge of any personal experience is the first-person. Which is not to say that such an assessment is always without merit, which it isn't.
-------------------- Vi Veri Universum Vivus Vici
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pwnzer
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Re: "I know because I know!" [Re: falcon]
#21929490 - 07/11/15 04:06 PM (8 years, 6 months ago) |
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idk man
Edited by pwnzer (07/11/15 04:07 PM)
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Kurt
Thinker, blinker, writer, typer.

Registered: 11/26/14
Posts: 1,688
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Quote:
DividedQuantum said:
Quote:
Kurt said: Divided Quantum; the position I saw in Nuentoter's post seems reasonable to me. It is generally suggestive of acknowledging the practical beginning point where all post-cartesian thinkers "lovingly" begin.
I sympathize with nuentoter's position as well, in some respects, and I said as much in my post. But the simple fact remains that what I said is true. The worst judge of any personal experience is the first-person. Which is not to say that such an assessment is always without merit, which it isn't.
Well, I know it is a physical and biological fact that sensory experience will occur to a single living person. I'd call that a simple fact in one sense, although it definitely isn't based on solipsism, so I don't think it is simple or factual in any manner in which we are speaking.
How much can anyone lean on "this", would suggest my response though, as a "phenomenologist" for the purpose of argument. Respectively, I'd say the judgements you are speaking of are potentially helpful or practically useful, I just doubt that they are necessarily imperative in any certain sense. I'd say what you are talking about is assuming pragmatics, which are not "true" in any case, but depend on the specific domain, and context of experience.
I'd say there will be many cases where it is plainly best to rely on first person intuition, either in life itself, or scientific research. However much conjecture will be implicitly dictated, phenomenological intuition will always be popping its head up as much into the universe, as to our conjectures of it. It is not a fact, but it is the basis of epistemology, which will inform all facts we find.
Adopting phenomenology or first person approaches in principle can lead to reliable value judgements, if on the "eccentric" side of life. I'll attest to that. For instance, there are some things that I know, that I would never attempt to claim, and I would see no point to attempting to. I'm just saying, and if anyone is (I dunno) uptight about independently embodying knowledge, I'll just say that "knowledge is pragmatic", it is the basis of way of reliable action, and I'll call this my personal intuition. It's what tells me to look before I leap, and that's a first person thing.
I would certainly be willing to admit that this intuition is not always the best or most appropriate to rely on in ANY case, but in these cases, I would like to avoid falling into a complete "implied" leveling of the value of 1st person experience to 3rd person evaluation of experience. In that sense I'd say I am a pragmatist.
I think what I would say to the prospect of practical judgement, as a conjecture, is that the background that dictates contingency of arguments can't be generally theorized or insinuated in a one dimensional way. It isn't this table of analysis where isolated arguments are "made examples of". The appeal in propositional reflection has to be directly found in the actual contingency of arguments. That relation also seems to me to imply epistemological holism.
I not saying this is more practical than anything else, but it would be my attempt to be constructive as per your suggestion which seems to me loose enough. It could be a useful consideration for paradigmatic fields of science. I'm not sure if it's a perfect philosophical approach, but it doesn't seem like there are many of those anyway. I find it interesting...
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Confirmation_holism
Edited by Kurt (07/11/15 05:41 PM)
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DividedQuantum
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Re: "I know because I know!" [Re: Kurt]
#21929881 - 07/11/15 05:36 PM (8 years, 6 months ago) |
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Excellent points.
-------------------- Vi Veri Universum Vivus Vici
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Kurt
Thinker, blinker, writer, typer.

Registered: 11/26/14
Posts: 1,688
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falcon



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Re: "I know because I know!" [Re: pwnzer]
#21930292 - 07/11/15 06:57 PM (8 years, 6 months ago) |
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nuentoter
conduit



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Re: "I know because I know!" [Re: falcon]
#21932466 - 07/12/15 08:19 AM (8 years, 6 months ago) |
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Trust me I am not saying first person experience is in any way infallible. Quite the opposite actually, but it is the basis for all knowledge we have. If 2 people, one a devout Christian and one a person of science experience something like a golden colored ring of light on the sky, there will be two very different accounts of what happened. Two experiences of the same happening. The scientific mind will analyze based upon his knowledge and produce a scientific theory of what could have possibly caused the phenomenon. The religious mind will analyze the same data but produce a theory based on their knowledge of religion. This is obvious. People are often wrong in the long run about experiences that cannot be readily explained by common knowledge. But my point was to push the idea that until the experience is quantified by research empirical testing and so forth, the experience must stand on its own. It is reality until someone proves otherwise. With enough proof it becomes "true". More or less..
My question then I guess is if someone were of scientific mind with no tendency towards fantastical notion, such as Sudly States his view is, and they experience something like... hmmm a bodiless voice. What would you folks think?
This experience has been shared by some scientists such as Descartes, Carl Jung, Julian Jaynes, Socrates, Newton, Freud, and others. But according to physics and all known science it cannot unless these people were having hallucinations which should discredit the account.
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The geometry of us is no chance. We are antennae, we are tuning forks, we are receiver and transmitters of all energy. We are more than we know. - @entheolove "I found I could say things with color and shapes that I couldn't say any other way - things I had no words for" - Georgia O'Keefe I think the word is vagina
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falcon



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Re: "I know because I know!" [Re: nuentoter]
#21933771 - 07/12/15 02:38 PM (8 years, 6 months ago) |
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Auditory hallucinations, something in the environment that sounds like a word or words or audilization. Audilization isn't a word, but I don't think it's unlikely, given that visualization is so common that some don't do what it would describe.
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ballsalsa
Universally Loathed and Reviled



Registered: 03/11/15
Posts: 20,866
Loc: Foreign Lands
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Re: "I know because I know!" [Re: falcon]
#21934391 - 07/12/15 05:14 PM (8 years, 6 months ago) |
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Colter
Quote:
Colter arrived back at Fort Raymond and few believed his reports of geysers, bubbling mudpots and steaming pools of water. His reports of these features were often ridiculed at first, and the region was somewhat jokingly referred to as "Colter's Hell".
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