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... Registered: 03/31/09 Posts: 1,741 Loc: USA |
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Anyone else find the region very interesting and complex. I've been reading on a daily basis about the Middle East for the last year.
This article is from an intelligence agency, Stratfor, and you have to be a paid subscriber to access the article. Some background: ISIL = Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant = al-Qaeda in Syria & Iraq ISIL = ~12,000 to ~15,000 fighters ISIL opponents (pretty much everyone): Jabhat al-Nusra (supposedly less radical/crazy than the ISIL)= another branch of al-Qaeda in Syria = 10,000 to 15,000 fighters Islamic Front = non-al-Qaeda rebel group = Largest rebel group in Syria = ~45,000 fighters -------------------------------- In Syria, a Bleak Future for an Al Qaeda Front Group Summary Although the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is ramping up its campaign in Iraq, it is finding itself increasingly threatened in Syria. Hundreds of rebels and ISIL fighters have died as part of the largest and most serious rift between rebel and al Qaeda-linked forces since the start of the Syrian civil war. The rate of losses is unsustainable, but there is little reason to think ISIL will back down in either Iraq or Syria. Analysis Provoked by incessant raids, detentions, assassinations, mutilations and the imposition of strict rules on rebel-held territories, Jaish al-Mujahideen and the Syrian Revolutionaries Front attacked a number of ISIL positions in Aleppo and Idlib on Jan. 3. The rebel offensive against ISIL has led to the capture of many ISIL positions across northern Syria, causing the jihadist group to threaten a withdrawal from areas where it is fighting the al Assad regime if rebel attacks do not cease within 24 hours. The rift is understood to represent a blow to the ongoing fight against the Syrian regime, but the ISIL has occasionally been so aggressive toward other rebel groups that a consensus has emerged that the group must be handled. Indeed, a large number of rebel groups are increasingly accusing the group of being a creation of the Syrian regime. While the powerful Islamic Front insists that the ISIL is unaffiliated with the regime, it has also clashed with the group and is threatening to fully enter the conflict alongside the other groups. In particular, the kidnapping, mutilation and killing of a popular commander from the rebel group Ahrar al-Sham has enraged many within the Islamic Front. Hassan Aboud, head of the Islamic Front's political bureau, has squarely blamed the al Qaeda-linked group for the situation. Of particular interest are Jabhat al-Nusra's actions in the rift. On the one hand, Jabhat al-Nusra is affiliated with ISIL in the sense that both claim to be part of al Qaeda. On the other hand, there is a long-standing dispute over legitimacy between Jabhat al-Nusra leader Abu Mohammed al-Golani and the megalomaniacal leader of ISIL, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. That Jabhat al-Nusra has taken over ISIL's position in Atmeh in northern Syria does not bode well for al-Baghdadi's group. In fact, there have been unconfirmed reports that Jabhat al-Nusra, in conjunction with longtime ally Ahrar al-Sham, has attacked and seized ISIL positions in the group's stronghold of Raqqa. These events come at a time when the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant has managed to secure the greatest extent of territory in Iraq since U.S. forces left the country. Though ISIL gains in Iraq remain tenuous due to opposition from the central government and Sunni tribes, the group has reportedly managed to seize considerable parts of Ramadi, practically half of Fallujah and even allegedly captured 23 M1 Abrams tanks belonging to the Iraq 1st Division when it overran an Iraqi base in Fallujah. While these events represent significant gains for ISIL in Iraq, the fact that the group has suddenly found itself heavily committed on two fronts does not bode well for its long-term success. In a matter of days, the group has lost hundreds of fighters in combat across Syria and Iraq, an unsustainable rate of attrition for an organization that fields at most 15,000 fighters. The ISIL offensive in Fallujah and Ramadi has also come at an opportune time for the extremist group. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's decision Dec. 30 to dismantle a yearlong protest camp in Ramadi triggered significant backlash from Sunni Anbar tribesmen. Taking advantage of these tensions, ISIL has attempted to seize substantial amounts of territory in Anbar province, but the bulk of the manifestly anti-al Maliki Sunni tribes of Anbar have also been quick to turn around and fight ISIL as it moved in on the cities. With increasingly well-equipped central government forces moving in on ISIL and with local tribes still very hostile to the group, even its position in Iraq is unstable. However, given the nature and ideology of ISIL's leadership, it will be difficult for the group to concede its fight with Iraqi tribesmen and other Syrian rebels. This effectively ensures that ISIL will remain in conflict with practically all armed forces in Syria and Iraq, including Kurdish militias, regime forces, opposition groups and even Turkey. For all the dedication and motivation of its fighters, ISIL simply does not have the manpower or the force to overcome its innumerable enemies and achieve its end goals of establishing its version of an Islamic caliphate in Syria and Iraq. Stratfor
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... Registered: 03/31/09 Posts: 1,741 Loc: USA |
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Iraqi security forces kill 55 Qaeda fighters
As Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki vowed on Saturday to eliminate “all terrorist groups” from Anbar, the country’s security forces killed 55 al-Qaeda-linked fighters in two areas near the Sunni province’s city of Ramadi. Staff General Ali Ghaidan Majeed told Agence France-Presse that 25 fighters from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) were killed in one operation and 30 in a second. Parts of Anbar’s Ramadi and Fallujah cities, west of Baghdad, have been held by militants for days, harkening back to the years after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion when both cities were insurgent strongholds. “We will not back down until we end all terrorist groups and save our people in Anbar,” AFP quoted Maliki as telling Iraqiya state television. Hamid al-Hashim, member of Anbar’s provincial council, told Al Arabiya News Channel Saturday that the inner part of Fallujah city has fallen under ISIL’s control for the past three days. But he said “tribes in the western areas in Fallujah were heroic in their fight against ISIL, and are currently reorganizing themselves to liberate the city.” The allied forces of local police and tribesmen made up those fighting the militant group, but officials said eight Iraqi soldiers were killed Saturday during clashes in Ramadi and Fallujah. Tribal leaders and officials also said Iraqi troops were trying to retake Anbar from a mixture of Islamist and tribal foes in Ramadi overnight after shelling Fallujah. At least eight people were killed and 30 were wounded in Fallujah, and residents of both cities said the fighting had limited their access to food, and that they were running low on generator fuel. Shops were sending food to mosques, and people were being asked through loudspeakers to go to collect it. On Friday alone, fighting between police and allied tribesmen on one side and ISIL militants on the other, killed more than 100 people in Ramadi and Fallujah, security officials said. Hashim said “police are now being equipped with newer and more fatal weapons” and the tribes in Anbar have succeeded in recruiting 1,500 men to push ISIL away from the city. On Wednesday, Maliki pulled the military out of the Anbar cities to give security duties to local police to appease Sunnis who see the army as a tool of the prime minister’s rule. But al-Qaeda militants promptly erupted in Fallujah, Ramadi and several nearby towns, overrunning police station, driving out security forces and freeing prisoners. Fighting has been ongoing in Ramadi since Monday when security forces removed the main anti-governmental protest camps. Demonstrations there started in late 2012 against what Sunni Arabs say is the marginalization and targeting of their community. The protests then spread to Fallujah causing security forces to withdraw from both areas, leaving room for al-Qaeda-linked militant group the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant to move in. Meanwhile, Iraq’s parliamentary speaker, Osama al-Nujaifi, called for urgent humanitarian assistance for the people in Anbar. Reports of people fleeing the fighting circulated but Anbar’s mayor on Saturday denied that civilians were leaving. U.S. condemns Qaeda The United States on Saturday said it was closely watching developments in Anbar and condemned al-Qaeda-linked fighters for committing “barbarism.” “Their barbarism against civilians of Ramadi and Fallujah and against Iraqi Security Forces is on display for all to see," State Department deputy spokeswoman Marie Harf said in a statement. The United States was in “close contact” both with Iraq’s political leaders and with “tribal leaders from Anbar province who are showing great courage as they fight to eject these terrorist groups from their cities,” Harf said. Some tribal leaders have “declared an open revolt against ISIL,” she said, adding the U.S. aims to “support those tribes in every possible way.”
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Spränger Språnger Registered: 07/23/11 Posts: 3,918 Last seen: 8 years, 3 months |
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I'm interested in the middle east, but it would be fun to read some news that wasn't about whatever paramilitary bullshit organization is doing to some other. You know, regular news, not this war-death-islamism crap over and over again.
-------------------- I have pneumonia
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NEMO Registered: 05/03/10 Posts: 19,636 Last seen: 6 months, 4 days |
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ty for posting.
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NEMO Registered: 05/03/10 Posts: 19,636 Last seen: 6 months, 4 days |
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Quote: regular news? everything is about the wars. the people only know war.
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Spränger Språnger Registered: 07/23/11 Posts: 3,918 Last seen: 8 years, 3 months |
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Haha. Fresh. Seriously though, it would be interesting to read machine gun free news for a change.
-------------------- I have pneumonia
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... Registered: 03/31/09 Posts: 1,741 Loc: USA |
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Here are some predictions that Stratfor is making for the upcoming year in the Middle East.
Middle East U.S.-Iranian Talks Take Center Stage The U.S. attempt to resurrect a balance of power in the Middle East through a strategic detente with Iran will be the driving issue for the Middle East in 2014. Between U.S. President Barack Obama's growing struggle with Congress ahead of November midterm elections and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani's ongoing challenge of trying to garner support from hardliners at home, there are sure to be hurdles in the U.S.-Iranian negotiations that could at times make the talks appear to be on the verge of collapse. Despite the unavoidable obstacles, the U.S.-Iranian detente will endure this year. However, a comprehensive settlement between Washington and Tehran -- and thus an end to the Iranian sanctions -- will take more than 12 months to develop. Obama will rely on his executive powers to skirt or override congressional resistance on sanctions relief when needed. Both the U.S. and Iranian governments will also be able to use domestic resistance to the deal as leverage in the negotiation. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which stands to lose the most economically and politically from a U.S.-Iranian deal, will be the most assertive challenger to the negotiation from Iran's side, but it will ultimately lack the institutional backing and public support to overturn the process. The Scope of U.S.-Iranian Talks The U.S.-Iranian negotiation will publicly focus on neutralizing the Iranian nuclear program in exchange for economic relief for much of the year. However, talks will extend quietly to other areas of mutual interest, including Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Afghanistan, as the two sides negotiate a balance of power in the region. That said, progress will be uneven in each of these arenas as the United States and Iran struggle to work out their differences and influence a maze of competing ethnic and sectarian forces. As the United States prioritizes a difficult negotiation with Iran over the interests of its traditional allies in the region, the resulting strain in those relationships will hamstring U.S. efforts to work out the region's thornier issues. However, this is a price the United States is willing to pay while working toward a settlement with Iran. Saudi Arabia's Lack of Options Saudi Arabia, though deeply unnerved at the prospect of its primary patron developing a relationship with its main regional adversary, will lack the power and influence to derail the negotiation. The Saudi government will attempt to tighten and strengthen an Arab coalition against Iran (this time without U.S. backing), but this effort will be mostly hollow, especially since the Gulf Cooperation Council states will remain divided over how far they are willing to go in maintaining an antagonistic relationship with their Persian neighbor. Despite the obvious strain between Washington and Riyadh, the United States will maintain its relationship with the Saudi royals and other Gulf states through military and energy deals. As the U.S.-Iranian deal progresses, the Saudi government might consider quietly opening up a back channel with Tehran to directly negotiate a truce with its adversary. Most of Saudi Arabia's focus this year, however, will be on trying to maintain influence in still-active sectarian battlegrounds. Syrian Fighting and Spillover Continue Syria will remain the main proxy battlefield between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Despite multilateral efforts to negotiate a political transition in Syria, no negotiation will quell the Syrian civil war this year. Limitations to external aid for the rebels and efforts to neutralize the Syrian chemical weapons program will keep the civil war relatively contained. Although they will receive continued financial and military aid from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other Gulf donors, the rebels will not receive a substantial boost in their fighting capabilities from the West. Iran's strong support for the Syrian regime and Hezbollah reinforcements will make the imbalance of power on the Syrian battlefield even starker, but the regime will continue to face constraints in manpower and logistics in retaking rebel territory. The loyalist forces will have enough of a military advantage this year to enable Syrian President Bashar al Assad to manipulate elections, scheduled for the spring, in favor of the Alawite minority while playing rival rebel factions against one another. A large and capable jihadist presence in Syria will encourage the slow rise of an indigenous jihadist movement in Lebanon. Hezbollah will have to split its attention between an emerging Sunni militant threat in Lebanon and reinforcing its sectarian allies in Syria. The Lebanese political and militant landscape will become even more fragmented in 2014 as various factions seek accommodation with one another to adapt to Iran's strengthening role in the region. Hezbollah and Iran will try to take advantage of the atmosphere of negotiation in an attempt to push the United States toward accepting Hezbollah as a political actor and to formally integrate Hezbollah's militia into the Lebanese army for the Shiite organization's long-term preservation. Strained U.S.-Israeli Relations Hamper Peace Talks Like the U.S.-Saudi relationship, the U.S.-Israeli relationship will experience a great deal of strain as the United States absorbs the political cost of distancing itself from Israel while its policy for the region evolves. Israel will adapt reluctantly to the situation, focusing its efforts on shaping the terms of the U.S.-Iranian negotiation in the hopes of mitigating the Iranian nuclear threat. Israel will use its sense of betrayal to drag its feet in any U.S. effort to reinvigorate the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The deeply fragmented Palestinian political landscape, along with Egypt's disinterest and preoccupation, will further hamper the peace process. Egypt's Military Consolidates Power Amid a Growing Jihadist Threat The Egyptian military will use the spring election cycle to further entrench its authority and stack the government with political allies. Political unrest will persist -- but not to a paralyzing degree -- as the Muslim Brotherhood struggles to recuperate from its losses and as the military selectively co-opts Salafists into the government. An Egyptian economic collapse is unlikely, though Cairo will remain severely constrained as it tries to manage a burgeoning electricity crisis and unavoidable subsidy cuts amid a protest-prone populace. Egypt's continued dependence on aid from Gulf patrons keen on suppressing the Muslim Brotherhood and like-minded political forces will help Cairo manage its economic challenges. On the security front, Egypt will face a persistent jihadist threat in the Sinai Peninsula that will spill increasingly into Egypt's core urban areas. Egypt's preoccupation in managing its political, economic and security challenges means Cairo will be unable to play a decisive role in Arab affairs beyond its borders in 2014. Hamas, blocked in by Egypt and Israel, will maintain a close relationship with Iran in the meantime. A Distracted Turkey Seeks Balance in the Region While Tehran stands to strengthen its regional position through accommodation with Washington, Turkey will look for ways to balance against Iran. These efforts will be most visible in Iraq, where Turkey will try to anchor its influence in the north through energy deals with the Kurdistan Regional Government while Iran maintains a dominant position in Baghdad through the Shiite-led government. Iraq's national elections, scheduled for April, will highlight this competition. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki will attempt to retain his post while leaning on both Tehran and Washington to pressure Turkey and the Iraqi Kurdish leadership to respect Baghdad's authority in managing the country's energy resources. The result will be a stalemate: Baghdad will try to avoid pushing the Kurds too far in an election year while it also deals with a persistent jihadist threat, and Ankara will struggle to work out a compromise with Baghdad and Tehran while trying to maintain Kurdish support in a volatile election season at home. Periodic truces are possible, but a grand bargain satisfying the interests of Baghdad, Ankara and Arbil in northern Iraq's energy exports is unlikely this year. Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party will face great internal stress as a coalition of unlikely allies -- including the Gulen movement, members of the business elite and the main opposition Republican People's Party -- finds common cause to weaken Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's position and undercut the ruling party in local and presidential elections. The government's ambitious peace process with the Kurdistan Workers' Party will reach an impasse, with the government too politically constrained to agree to concessions on political amnesty and the Kurds without an incentive to withdraw their forces. The Kurdistan Workers' Party's frustration over the negotiations, particularly ahead of elections and as the ruling party is already facing challenges on multiple fronts, could lead to large public demonstrations and sporadic attacks, but a full resurgence of Turkey's Kurdish insurgency this year is unlikely. Turkey will use this year to reprioritize its foreign policy objectives. While trying to further its gains in northern Iraq, Turkey will have limited influence in Syria and Egypt. Outside the Arab world, Turkey will maintain a dialogue with Armenia and Cyprus in an attempt to extend its influence in the Caucasus and the eastern Mediterranean, but a diplomatic breakthrough in either arena will be difficult. Turkey's ties with Israel will improve gradually, but Ankara will prefer to keep the relationship muted while it tries to shape perceptions in the Arab world. Instability Persists in North Africa The Maghreb will be less affected by the implications of the U.S.-Iranian negotiation but will face its fair share of challenges. Libyan instability will be at the heart of the region's security issues in 2014. Even as Western states push the transitional national authority in Tripoli to move ahead in the lengthy process of drafting a constitution and forming a new government, Tripoli will continue to struggle in asserting its authority over a fragmented tribal and militia landscape. Tripoli will coordinate with foreign capitals to train small groups of soldiers to help boost its fledgling national army's capabilities and organization. In trying to counter the decentralization of authority that defined much of Libyan instability in 2013, Tripoli will also work to co-opt smaller militia and tribal groups throughout the country. At the same time, Tripoli will attempt to partner with larger regional centers of authority to rein in renegade armed groups and militants that have benefited greatly from Libya's current security vacuum. This is sure to be a violent process in which control over energy infrastructure will be used as leverage. Expect oil production and exports to fluctuate greatly as a result. Instability in Libya will continue benefiting regional jihadists in search of a haven and staging ground for attacks. Neighboring Algeria and Tunisia in particular will not be immune to such attacks, but Algiers will maintain its security cooperation with Tunis and, to a lesser degree, Tripoli as it tries to insulate itself in the coming year. Algeria will try to expand its political, security and economic inroads into Tunisia as the latter continues through its difficult political transition. Algiers will also maintain security coordination with the Sahel states to the south and continue low-level political provocations with Morocco to ensure Rabat remains too distracted by domestic political and economic challenges to interfere with Algeria's regional policies. Algerian President Abdel Aziz Bouteflika and his faction will work toward securing a victory in the upcoming presidential election -- whether Bouteflika or an ally runs for the office -- and overseeing changes to the constitution while balancing competing military, political and economic interests. The success of Bouteflika's internal political management will determine how far Algiers goes in its attempts to revive foreign investment in the energy sector later in the year. http://www.stratfor.com/forecast
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... Registered: 03/31/09 Posts: 1,741 Loc: USA |
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Syria rebels lay siege to Al-Qaeda-linked fighters
Rebel fighters, including ones from the newly formed Islamic Front, laid siege Monday to Al-Qaeda-linked fighters in their northern stronghold of Raqqa, freeing 50 captives, including a Turkish journalist, said the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. Raqqa emerged as a new front Sunday in fighting among rebels battling to oust President Bashar al-Assad, with various groups joining forces against Al-Qaeda affiliate the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Raqqa is the only provincial capital to have fallen out of regime hands since the conflict erupted after a bloody crackdown by Assad's forces on democracy protests in March 2011. But soon afterward, it fell into the grip of the ISIL, which is said to be holding hundreds of prisoners in their now besieged headquarters in the heart of Raqqa. One of those captives, Turkish photographer Ben Aygun from the newspaper Milliyet, who was taken hostage in mid-December, was released Monday. A spokesman for the Islamic Front told Al Jazeera his group had freed Aygun and transported him to Turkey via the Bab al-Hawa border crossing. "Every night, I had the same dream that I was being freed. I cannot believe that I am free now. It feels like a dream," Milliyet quoted Aygun as saying. Monday's offensive in Raqqa came three days after three powerful rebel alliances launched what they called a second revolution, against the ISIL in the northern provinces of Aleppo and Idlib. On Sunday the rebel infighting spread to the central province of Hama, as well as Raqqa, and the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights says scores of insurgents have been killed on both sides. A key complaint against ISIL among rebels — including the massive Islamic Front, the Syrian Revolutionaries Front and nascent Mujahedeen Army — is that its extremist fighters refuse to operate within the broader opposition dynamic. The ISIL, as its name suggests, seeks to lay the foundation for the restoration of an Islamic caliphate in Iraq and Syria. Removing Assad from power is the first step the fighters want to take, and their aims initially aligned with moderate Islamist and civil-state-minded rebel factions. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said "the main group laying siege to ISIL's headquarters in Raqqa is Al-Nusra Front," which, like the ISIL, is affiliated with Al-Qaeda but is composed primarily of homegrown Syrian fighters and has been more cooperative with other rebel factions. The ISIL and Al-Nusra have fought each other in recent months, after the ISIL announced it was Al-Qaeda's representative in Syria. Al-Nusra has been operating in Syria longer and refused to work under the ISIL's command. The 33-month conflict in Syria is estimated to have killed more than 130,000 people and forced millions more to flee their homes as refugees or internally displaced people. http://america.aljazeera.com/art
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... Registered: 03/31/09 Posts: 1,741 Loc: USA |
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Al Qaida rebels leave mass grave behind as they desert base in Syria
Islamist extremists forced to abandon their base in Syria’s central Hama province left behind a mass grave with a dozen corpses, mostly civilians, including four women, local activists reported Monday. The discovery at Kafr Zeta was likely to fuel the drive to force foreign fighters from the Islamist State of Iraq and Syria out of the conflict and, most probably, Syria. On the fifth day of a surprise offensive against ISIS by a wide range of Syrian insurgents, fierce fighting was reported in Raqqa, a provincial capital that is an ISIS stronghold, and in at least two districts of Aleppo, Syria’s biggest city. ISIS reportedly had abandoned Jarabulus, a major border crossing with Turkey, and its forces were under siege at Tal Abyad, another border point. The offensive appears to have galvanized many of Syria’s disparate fighting forces into a level of cooperation rarely seen on the ground, and it may have given new life to remnants of the U.S.-backed Free Syrian Army, which many wrote off as a spent force a month ago. Dan Layman, a spokesman for the Syrian Support Group, a Washington-based group that raises money for the rebels, said that rebels formerly identified with the FSA were now fighting in one of two groups, the Syrian Revolutionary Front, with 10,000 to 15,000 fighters, and the Jaysh al Mujahideen, or Mujahideen Army, which has about 12,000 fighters. A third rebel faction, the Islamic Front, which supports the establishment of a Syria governed by Islamic law, has taken a leading role in the fighting and was believed to be in control of Jarabulus and pressing for control of Tal Abyad. The Nusra Front, yet another rebel faction, also has taken a role in the fighting against ISIS. Like ISIS, Nusra is an al Qaida affiliate and traces its roots also to al Qaida in Iraq. The U.S. government a year ago designated Nusra a terrorist group, saying it was simply another name for al Qaida in Iraq, which renamed itself ISIS in April. The two groups frequently cooperated with one another in battles against Syrian government forces. Nusra reportedly collaborated with the other rebel factions to arrange ISIS’ departure from its Kafr Zeta base. According to Muhannad Jnaid, a rebel captain, ISIS initially had agreed last week to surrender the Kafr Zeta base in a deal brokered by Nusra. But a group of ISIS fighters who had sneaked away from the main group opened fire on the rebels, killing five. Fighting resumed until Sunday, when the ISIS forces again sent a message through Nusra that they were ready to surrender the base and their weapons, Jnaid told McClatchy. On Sunday night, the ISIS forces departed in the company of Nusra troops; other rebel units occupying the base discovered, however, that not all the ISIS units had left their weapons behind. “We’ve asked Nusra to bring the rest of the weapons back,” he said. The rebels found the mass grave when they searched the base. There were at least a dozen corpses, with many residents of other towns. Ahmad Bayoush, an activist, said three of the dead were from his hometown of Kafr Anbil, and the corpses of all three showed signs of torture. He identified one as Mansour Assalloum, a 16-year-old boy; the other two were men. Activist Basil Darwish said four women were among those buried in the grave, two from the city of Hama and two from the nearby town of Latamneh. He identified one of the victims as Abdulkarim al Qasim, a lawyer from the nearby town of Morek. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/
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... Registered: 03/31/09 Posts: 1,741 Loc: USA |
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... Registered: 03/31/09 Posts: 1,741 Loc: USA |
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... Registered: 03/31/09 Posts: 1,741 Loc: USA |
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Strategic Horizons: The Middle East Is Not Obama’s to Lose
President Barack Obama, according to pundits, is losing the Middle East. The charge recalls those leveled after Mao Zedong’s 1949 victory in the Chinese civil war, when anti-communists in the United States accused the Truman administration of “losing China.” While advocates of this position never explained how any feasible level of U.S. support could have staved off Chiang Kai-Shek’s defeat, the idea that refusing to back friendly dictators leads to preventable strategic disasters subsequently became ingrained in American thinking. It later inspired Lyndon Johnson’s refusal to disengage from Vietnam even when it became clear that the Saigon regime could not win and, more broadly, delegitimized the idea of cutting American losses when partners proved unsalvageable and conflicts intractable. In other words, an incorrect reading of the China situation paved the way for further strategic mistakes. The narrative that Obama has lost or is losing the Middle East began to form in 2011 and is now growing among Obama’s critics. Front Page Magazine, for instance, ran an article in October entitled “Obama Loses the Middle East.” A November column on Mediate.com asserted that “Obama, Not Bush, Lost the Middle East.” Writing in Commentary, Joshua Tobin asserted that Obama is “losing the Middle East to Putin.” Undoubtedly more will follow. But the “Obama lost the Middle East” assertion is just as flawed and overly simplistic as the idea that “Truman lost China.” That the Middle East was America’s to lose is hubris verging on narcissism. The post-colonial social and political order in the region was fragile and brittle from its inception. But it held together for a while. Just as the Soviet Union used domestic repression, ideology and a historical fear of external meddling to keep a dysfunctional political and economic system tottering along for more than 60 years, the Middle Eastern political order survived through powerful internal security organizations, oil wealth, superpower support, a shared dislike of Israel and immigration to Europe and North America when populations grew faster than economies. Eventually, though, information technology and global interconnectedness awakened the region’s formerly submissive people, undercutting the old order and unleashing social and political revolution. As the United States tried to understand this, Washington looked for an analogy to guide policy. For the Obama administration and its supporters, the 1979 Iranian revolution seemed relevant, suggesting that clinging to an increasingly unpopular but pro-American dictator who resists deep political and economic change can be worse than cutting losses and disengaging. The longer an unpopular dictator hangs on due to U.S. support, this thinking went, the greater the chances that radicals hostile to American interests will seize control of the opposition and emerge victorious. While this idea may have made sense, Obama’s approach to the Middle East uprisings has been hindered by an unwillingness to prioritize divergent and often conflicting objectives, including addressing humanitarian disasters, stopping the use of chemical weapons, containing Iranian influence, containing Salafi extremists, promoting Israeli security, avoiding association with dictators and limiting U.S. political and military involvement in a time of economic difficulty and domestic war-weariness. It has also been constrained by the president’s inherent risk-aversion as amplified by the hyperpoliticization of American security policy. Even so, it is not accurate to assert that Obama “lost” the Middle East. The old political and economic order there had reached the end of its sustainable lifespan, thus rendering the American strategy of supporting friendly authoritarian regimes obsolete. Revolutions often begin as reform movements, which are then hijacked by radicals or extremists. The good news in the Middle East is that the most extreme radicals—the various Salafi groups affiliated with or inspired by al-Qaida—have no ability to consolidate power like the Russian Bolsheviks or Chinese communists. At the same time, there are no apparent George Washingtons or Nelson Mandelas with the vision and personal power to channel revolutionary energy into a less destructive and more inclusive stability. Nor can the United States create those leaders, as Hamid Karzai and Nouri al-Maliki demonstrate. There may, though, be Middle Eastern Napoleons—new authoritarians who emerge from the military, as could be happening in Egypt. Now the United States must navigate a series of challenges. One is framing a response to the Middle East’s new military authoritarians, should they emerge. The best situation would obviously be if they seek to stabilize their countries and set them on the road to sustainable democracy and economic growth, rather than attempting to consolidate personal power like a Hosni Mubarak or Saddam Hussein. The United States must learn to recognize which type an emergent strongman is, but history suggests that Washington is not good at this. A mistaken character judgment was, after all, one reason the United States embraced Anwar Sadat. A second challenge will be to do as much as possible to guide Middle Eastern monarchies toward a soft landing when the revolution finally engulfs them. For all of Mubarak’s mistakes, he did leave without destroying his nation. Egypt at least has the potential to emerge stable, democratic and prosperous. Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, by contrast, seems willing to destroy his nation rather than cede power. The problem is that in most of the Middle Eastern monarchies there is no equivalent to the Egyptian military, where loyalty to the nation trumps loyalty to the regime. Hence the downfall of the monarchies may lead to radical regimes simply because there is no moderate opposition in place. The third challenge for the United States is finding a way to draw and enforce red lines for these radical regimes, whose emergence seems increasingly inevitable. Can Americans tolerate an al-Qaida-style regime that does not support transnational terrorism? Can they tolerate further humanitarian disasters and civil wars like the one in Syria? Can they tolerate the further use of weapons of mass destruction? And how should the U.S. military be used to enforce any red lines that are formulated? More broadly, does sustaining a major U.S. military presence in the Middle East help more than it hurts? It helps contain Iran, but it also may lead regional states to put off the sort of deep reform that can prevent revolution or at least challenge revolutionary energy in a more benign direction. To put it differently, Washington must decide which is the greater threat: Iran or the possibility of more Syria-style civil wars. Ultimately the United States cannot stop the tide of revolution in the Middle East or even shape it in any major way. America can only affect it at the margins and, to a modest extent, limit the damage. But even this requires strategic vision and a working political consensus. Debates over whether Obama did or did not “lose” the Middle East may fill up the long hours of talk radio and rage in the blogosphere, but they make no contribution to a more effective American strategy.
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Stranger then you Registered: 02/23/13 Posts: 2,341 Last seen: 1 year, 2 months |
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breaking middle east news!
problem solved! j/k thats horrible -------------------- ![]()
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